


INSIDE THE BILDERBERG GROUP

AN EXCLUSIVE REPORT PREPARED BY
LIBERTY LOBBY AND THE SPOTLIGHT



Shown above is the actual invitation from Bilderberg founder, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, asking the recipient to participate in the 1957 Bilderberg Group conference at St. Simon's Island off the coast of Georgia. (Inside this special report is the actual Bilderberg members-only report of that conference along with other revealing documents from other Bilderberg meetings during the last four decades.)

**THIS REPORT INCORPORATES EXACT
PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRODUCTIONS OF
'CONFIDENTIAL' BILDERBERG DOCUMENTS
TAKEN FROM THE PRIVATE FILES OF A
LONG-TIME BILDERBERG MEMBER.**

WHAT'S A BILDERBERGER—AND WHY DOES IT MATTER WHAT THEY DO?

A Brief Introduction to this Special Assembly of Actual Bilderberg Documents . . .

The wide-ranging and heavy hand of Rockefeller family financial clout is evident behind the appointees named to high office by President Bill Clinton. However, Clinton is not the only president of recent memory whose appointees have moved in the Rockefeller family sphere of influence. Virtually every president in this century has had his share of Rockefeller-influenced appointees within powerful policy making positions. Many of these appointees have been affiliated with three distinct Rockefeller-created and Rockefeller-financed international policy power blocs which are often confused by their critics: the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, and the Bilderberg Group. (Clinton is a member of all three.) A reason for the confusion about the groups is that, aside from the fact that each is controlled—fully or in part—by the Rockefeller empire, the three groups are very similar in content and have a largely overlapping membership, usually working in direct concert toward the same goals. The membership in each of these groups is always composed of members of the Rockefeller family, their paid employees and consultants, allied international financiers and industrialists, academics from the major universities and tax free foundations, high-ranking union leaders, key media personalities and controllers, and selected political figures. However, each of the three—the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission and the Bilderberg Group—is very different. Here is a brief summary of each of the groups in question:

THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. Based in New York and comprised solely of U.S. citizens. Publishes the quarterly journal *Foreign Affairs* and conducts regular meetings and seminars. Key meetings are strictly confidential and off the record. Created in 1921 with Rockefeller funding and emerged as the American branch of the British Royal Institute on International Affairs (RIIA), succeeding an earlier, less organized entity already established in that role. The RIIA was the brainchild of English financier Cecil Rhodes (founder of the Rhodes scholarship) and devoted to the concept of reuniting the United States with the British Empire. David Rockefeller himself served as a longtime chairman of the CFR and remains its virtual master.

THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION. Organized exclusively by David Rockefeller in 1973. Holds an official regular annual conclave closed to the independent press, but conducts seminars and other gatherings that are less exclusive. Membership is limited to elitists from the United States and Canada, Western Europe and Japan, several hundred in number. Issues periodic reports known as the "Triangle Papers" and press releases and published a journal called *Dialogue* (now defunct). David Rockefeller has continuously served, since its inception, as "North American chairman" but is acknowledged as its primary mover.

THE BILDERBERG GROUP. Takes its name from the hotel in Holland where the group met in 1954, during the earliest period of its inception. Meets regularly (presumably on a once-a-year basis) at various locations around the world, always in extreme secrecy, often at resorts controlled by either the Rockefeller or Rothschild families. The Rothschild family is the leading European force within the Bilderberg Group, sharing its power with the American-based Rockefeller empire. Has a revolving membership of several hundred participants composed of elites from the United States and Western Europe, primarily—almost exclusively—from the NATO countries. (Representatives from the former Soviet Union and East Bloc countries have attended recent gatherings, however.) Maintains an extremely low profile seldom, if ever, publishes reports or studies (for the public, at least) under its own official aegis. Bilderberg participants denied the group's very existence for decades until forced into the open by the glare of media publicity, generated largely by LIBERTY LOBBY's weekly newspaper, *The SPOTLIGHT*, and its newsletter-format predecessors, "Liberty Letter" and "Liberty Lowdown" (the latter now defunct). Only mentioned in passing—if at all—in the major media.

The Bilderberg Group, among the three, is by far the most powerful and influential. It might be said that when a politician or media personality or some other influential figure is invited to a Bilderberg conclave that he or she has truly "made it." The documents that appear within the pages of this special report are actual, exact photoreproductions of a variety of private and highly confidential "members only" Bilderberg files (including the personal files of a long-time high-level Bilderberg member). The documents appear exactly as they came into the possession of LIBERTY LOBBY and *The SPOTLIGHT*. Any handwriting or other alterations that appear on the pages are from the original document(s). Absolutely nothing has been altered.

These are only a handful of perhaps several thousand photoreproductions of original Bilderberg materials that are now in the possession of LIBERTY LOBBY—much to the dismay of the Bilderbergers. The documents reproduced here provide a unique insight into the backstage maneuvering and high-level intrigue of the Bilderberg Group members. Accompanying the documents are clearly noted annotations by LIBERTY LOBBY explaining the nature of the document and pointing out significant items relating to the document. The materials selected are designed to demonstrate to the reader several things: a) that the Bilderberg Group does indeed exist and meet annually and does so in an organized fashion; its gatherings are neither "informal" nor are they "casual" as the Bilderbergers would suggest to the public; b) that Bilderberg is attended by a veritable international elite whose impact on policy making in their home countries is indisputable and that the conferences do indeed have an impact on such policy making; c) that the group does attempt to maintain a low profile and keep its deliberations under wraps; d) that major issues of world importance are discussed at these conferences and policies affecting those issues are indeed adopted through the aegis of the Bilderberg conferences.

This report is, beyond a doubt, the most detailed assembly of in-house Bilderberg documents ever issued to the world public, illustrating clearly, that the course of world events is very much a part of the Bilderberg agenda, whether the participants admit it or not. LIBERTY LOBBY and *The SPOTLIGHT* remain committed to reporting continually on the activities of this shadowy elite power bloc as we have done in-depth for now some thirty years. But where is the rest of the media?

On a shoestring budget, long-time SPOTLIGHT correspondent Jim Tucker has followed the Bilderbergers around the world for over a decade himself. As Tucker puts it: "If a group of the world's most popular TV personalities or football players met together for a secret meeting at an exclusive resort once a year, the worldwide media would be demanding to be admitted. But when the world's richest bankers and industrialists and powerful politicians and heads of state get together for a secret meeting, the media looks the other way. Why? Which is more important to the world at large?"

The SPOTLIGHT has led the way. Now it is up to the rest of the world media to take up the challenge and bring the truth about the Bilderberg Group's activities to the world public. If there's nothing "wrong" with what the Bilderberg is doing and the group has nothing to hide, then the media must DEMAND that the group open its conclaves to the media's inspection.

BILDERBERG CONFERENCE

MAY 29th-31st, 1954.

The following statement was released last night at Soestdyk Palace:

During the last three days a group of seventy-five Europeans and Americans have been meeting at the Hotel Bilderberg at Oosterbeek. The individuals attending this meeting were invited by His Royal Highness in order, by means of a free and frank exchange of views, to improve mutual understanding between Europeans and Americans on problems of common concern. There were present members of different political parties, representatives of business and labor and academic life. While some of the members are in active political life, all members were present only in their individual capacities, and no member spoke for any government or organisation. It was not the intention of the Conference to propose governmental action, but simply to determine the areas of agreement on these common problems, and to reach a better understanding as to the underlying reasons for differences in the attitudes prevailing amongst the European and American people. The members of the Conference all came from countries sharing the same basic democratic faith, and a firm devotion to liberty and to the rights and dignity of individual citizens.

During the course of the three-day Conference the members discussed the following subjects:

- A. The attitude toward Communism and the Soviet Union.
- B. The attitude toward dependent areas and peoples overseas.
- C. The attitude toward economic policies and problems.
- D. The attitude toward European integration and the European Defence Community.

As a result of the discussion, it developed that the extent of agreement among the members was far greater than had been foreseen, and even where there was a divergence of attitude the reasons for differing views were fully and frankly discussed, and are now better understood.

During the course of the discussion the following points were among those made on the subjects under consideration:

Shown above and on consecutive pages are exact photoreproductions of a press release issued by the Bilderberg Group after its first formal gathering at the Bilderberg Hotel in Holland. The group had not yet formally adopted the name by which it has since become known, but it very clearly had an international agenda in mind. Although the Bilderberg Group has periodically issued press releases (as a formality), it does not encourage press coverage. Critics ask the simple question: "Why?"

I. The attitude toward Communism and the Soviet Union

1. The peoples of the free nations of Western Europe and the United States are in full agreement that the combination of Communist ideology and Soviet military power is the paramount threat to individual freedom and free institutions. Faced with the threat of aggressive Communism, the Western nations are in the same boat, although it is a boat with several decks. If the boat sinks all will go down together. The differences which still exist between these nations on the subject of how to meet this threat are almost entirely differences of method rather than of purpose.

2. Criticism, which is an essential ingredient of a healthy democratic society, must also be an ingredient of the alliance of the West in both its strength and its weakness. Since the Western nations cannot act through compulsion or regimentation, progress is sometimes delayed, yet the fact that the Western alliance functions through the free consent of all members endows it with a moral and spiritual unity.

3. The basic purposes of the free world were described by different speakers at the Conference as freedom and security, freedom through security, and peace with liberty. The aim of the free nations is to deter aggression and to defend the free peoples. It is to protect the whole world against a war which might destroy civilization. Its strength is designed for defence and not for offensive purposes.

4. Good relations between the free nations must rest on good relations and understanding between the peoples of those nations; not merely on agreements between governments. Public misunderstandings could encourage Soviet aggression by creating a misleading impression of weakness within the alliance.

5. The Communist threat presents itself in different ways in varying countries. To most Americans it appears as a foreign conspiracy alien to all national traditions and treacherous in nature. To many Europeans Communism, while no less dangerous, appears as an ugly perversion of certain left-wing movements with long historical backgrounds. It was agreed that, in certain nations of Europe, many people vote Communist without considering themselves disloyal to their country, but in protest against what they regard as wrongs and injuries. In such countries, the Communist movement is cultivated by outside leadership, but it has roots in native soil.

6. Poverty and deprivation are contributions to Communism, but not its sole cause. There is no precise correlation

between the appeal of Communism and the existence of bad social conditions. In certain regions of Western Europe it attracts well-paid workers and in some cases intellectuals. Nevertheless, the best way to counteract Communism in the free countries is to demonstrate to the world that an adequate standard of living can be achieved for all people under conditions of freedom.

7. Soviet Communism is not a force of liberation, progress and social justice, but a movement of reaction and retrogression. This fact must be constantly emphasized.

8. It took Stalin to teach the free nations of the West how much they depend upon one another. Military co-operation has been seen by all to be necessary. It has been implemented through the North Atlantic Treaty. It was agreed that similar co-operation in the economic and political fields would greatly advance the prospects of world peace.

9. America sometimes charges its allies with slowness and undue deliberation in meeting the Communist threat. European nations sometimes feel that the United States is unreasonably impatient. The main difference between the European and American attitude toward the Communist threat is a different sense of timing. Both the Europeans and Americans understand that Communism is not like the weather, against which occasional local precautions can be taken, but that it is an active enemy requiring positive, energetic and steady opposition.

10. The opposition to Communism must be carried out through democratic means. Hatred must be kept to a minimum, as hatred breeds more hatred and becomes in itself a destructive force. Soviet Communism is a pseudo-religious imperialism or a perverted secular religion. It must be countered by a moral as well as a material force having superior power to command men's minds and hearts.

II. Attitude toward dependent areas and peoples overseas

1. The problem of dependent areas was explored as a source of possible misunderstanding between the United States and the European powers with responsibilities for such areas.

2. It was agreed that the welfare of the dependent peoples themselves should be the primary point of concern. It was recalled that the United Nations Charter sets forth the proper role of nations holding responsibility over less developed areas of the world. It is a role of trust, in the nature of a sacred mission, and has been so accepted by the nations signing the U.N. Charter.

3. Certain of the members argued that no dependent area should be given full independence until it is capable of maintaining its freedom, but that every effort should be made to create the pre-conditions for secure independence with all possible speed. A slightly different view was that the test should not be whether the dependent area is potentially able to protect a new-found sovereignty, but whether it has developed an adequate degree of literacy, political understanding and a viable economy. It was noted, however, that the achievement of these conditions would generally provide the best assurance against a loss of independence.

4. Under-developed areas are sometimes not well supplied with indigenous administrators and technicians capable of carrying on a democratic government. Some areas which have recently won independence have had to accept less efficient administrators and declining standards in various ways. Mention was made of the long program of development by the colonial powers in the fields of education, public health, nutrition, and economic production. It was stated that perhaps no colonial area in the world now shows a net profit to the power in possession, as a result of expensive programs of development.

5. On the other hand, a very strong wind of nationalism is blowing across the world, and under these circumstances, it was argued, demands for independence may not conform to any degree with the extent of preparation for independence in any given area. Dependent peoples, it was argued, show a willingness to buy their freedom, even at a high price to themselves in prosperity and orderly government; and they will not generally be willing to accept readjustments for self-government as the test of when self-government should begin.

6. The act of independence does not necessarily mark the emergence of a competent addition to the society of free nations. When treaties are signed and the ink is dry, it was stated, the process of creating a stable nation is not at an end.

7. It was pointed out that dependent areas would lose all chance to gain freedom if the free nations of the West should themselves lose their independence.

8. There was general agreement on the objective that the dependent peoples of the world must be assisted along the road that leads to self-government. There was a lack of agreement only as to the tempo of this movement. The American point of view tended to favor a more rapid tempo on the theory that nationalist feeling, contained too long, may explode into violence which can only benefit Communism. There was a difference of view among European spokesmen on the question of tempo, though full agreement on acceptance of the ultimate objective of self-government.

9. It was generally agreed that military action alone cannot be effective in such areas as Indo-China. It must be accompanied by political action as well. It was pointed out that a military success for Western forces in Indo-China, if not accompanied by a satisfactory political program, might lose hundreds of millions of people of Asia and Africa to the Western cause of freedom.

10. The differences between America and Europe with respect to the problem of overseas territories emerged from the discussion as minor by comparison with the areas of agreement. The obvious objective to be sought is an agreed policy of the West to work toward colonial self-government as rapidly and safely as is possible. Such a solution serves the interests of the West and of the dependent peoples. It thwarts the imperialistic interests of Communism.

III. Economic Policies and Problems

1. It was generally agreed that economic factors were no longer such a serious cause of friction between the United States and Europe as they were a few years ago. The chief reason for this was the improvement in the dollar situation which on the surface was very substantial. The diminution in purely economic aid which had accompanied it was psychologically valuable.

2. In 1953 American imports and expenditures abroad exceeded exports in total by some 2 billion dollars. This permitted an increase in the gold and dollar reserves of the rest of the world - especially Europe. But within Europe the increase has been very unevenly distributed. Moreover, the flow of dollars itself has been sustained only by abnormal American government expenditure - defense aid, offshore purchases, military expenditure and stockpiling - of some 4 1/2 billion dollars. Anxiety was therefore expressed lest, when this abnormal expenditure was cut down the dollar gap would reopen. It was recognized that rising levels of trade and investment remained essential ingredients in that "partnership for growth" between America and Europe which is essential.

3. The Randall Commission Report is evidence of the attitude of the present American administration on trade policy; the support of the American Business Community is evidence of new industrial thinking. All of President Eisenhower's trade program will not be adopted by the American Congress this year; nevertheless, European business men are aware that further tariff reductions are by no means the only important method of facilitating trade. Delays and uncertainty resulting from the intricacy of Customs regulations are equally frustrating to the freer flow of goods.

4. The condition of the American economy has significance for every European country, but the relatively minor fluctuations abroad of the decline in American economic activity during the past several months is an encouraging reminder that the European economies have grown in health and stability. There are a number of factors operating in the United States economy which will tend to prevent serious economic dislocations of long duration.

5. For some years now the United States has been producing manufactured goods at so fast a rate that it has become increasingly dependent on overseas sources for raw materials. This process will continue, and American imports, principally of raw materials, will rise gradually but substantially. The consequence should be a large increase in the supply of dollars to the rest of the world. The rise in American imports, however, will consist largely of goods from areas outside Europe. If therefore Europe is to have a share in the increased dollar earnings, it will have to export more to third countries in a framework of multilateral trade. The problem of convertibility of currencies was recognized as an important problem for the free world.

6. During the last few years, differences between America and Europe over East-West trade have been an important cause of friction. While trade between Western Europe and the Communist bloc has in fact been regulated in accordance with agreements reached between the governments of European countries and the United States, public opinion in America has been very much at odds with public opinion in Europe and vice versa on the subject.

7. It was recognized that this conflict sprang largely from the differences in the emotional reactions to the Korean war in America and Europe - differences which it was thought had recently diminished. It was hoped that the negotiations at present taking place on the list of controlled exports would do much to eliminate them.

It was the general opinion:

- (1) That certain exports of a strategic character to the Communist bloc would have to continue to be regulated in accordance with agreements made between the free nations, so that there would be no divisions among free nations.
- (2) That it was undesirable for the democratic countries to become too dependent on the Communist bloc for either supplies or markets.
- (3) That subject to these guiding principles, there was no objection to expanding trade with the Communist bloc where there were advantages to the free world.
- (4) That this trade was unlikely to reach a high level because of unwillingness on the Communist side to endanger their own self-sufficiency.
- (5) That agreement between the U.S.A. and Europe on these lines would go far to destroy the considerable propaganda advantage enjoyed by the Communists during the last few years from the dispute between America and Europe over East-West trade.

May 31st, 1954

IV. EUROPEAN UNION AND E.D.C.

1. European unity in some form has long been a Utopian dream, but the conference was agreed that it is now a necessity of our times. Only thus can the free nations of Europe achieve a moral and material strength capable of meeting any threat to their freedom.
2. The American members of the Conference expressed full support for the idea of European unification. They made it entirely clear, however, that American opinion is not doctrinaire as to the form unification should take. This is quite clearly a European problem which Europeans will solve in accordance with their own institutions and traditions.
3. There was discussion of the form for an effective unity. E.D.C. is a form of co-operation in one field proposed by European nations, and already ratified by several of the potential members. One member proposed that E.D.C. and all of its members might become an integral part of NATO, which already exists. This same proposal would contemplate the formation within NATO of a central organ of decision, capable of action in the political and economic as well as the military fields.
4. America's interest in European unification was presented as a result of the great sense of urgency that infuses American opinion and is shared by many Europeans. This desire for early and effective action does not reflect any lack of appreciation of the many difficulties faced by the European nations in seeking to find a successful formula. It was suggested that America's interest in the matter would be better understood and respected by Europeans if it were presented as to some extent an act of self-interest, involving America's own welfare, since human nature inevitably seeks private motives for public actions represented as purely unselfish.
5. It was stated that Europe does not wish to produce a "melting pot" in the American sense. It was pointed out in response that federation of the American states has not resulted in an insipid conformity of culture and character. It was further noted that the federation of the Swiss cantons provides a good example on a small scale, of uniting areas with differing languages, religions and customs for a greater strength with no sacrifice of individualism.
6. It was noted that Communist leadership has developed a fear of, and respect for, the idea of unity in Western Europe. The Communist ideology from Marx through Lenin and Stalin, has taught that the democratic nations of the West must collapse through internal stresses and through quarrels among themselves. If effective unity is achieved, this basic principle of Communism will be destroyed.
7. It was observed that the present is a moment of historic European opportunity. A momentum has developed which should not be permitted to slacken. The result of slackening might be a recrudescence of national rivalries which would greatly weaken the democratic forces and might lead to Soviet domination and the destruction of freedom.

APPENDIX TO PRESS RELEASE

1. In the first line change the release date to "10 a.m. June 1st".
2. Insert at the end of the paragraph numbered 2 on page two the following additional sentences:
"It was repeatedly emphasized that certain of the tensions which have disturbed relations between the United States and the countries of Western Europe have resulted from the lack of adequate consultation before important public steps were taken. It was agreed that improved machinery for consultation was highly desirable."
3. Insert at the end of paragraph numbered 5 on page six the following additional sentence:
"Reference was also made to the need for facilitating migration as a means of relieving poverty and over-population in certain areas."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1955.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GABRIEL HAUGE

I understand that next week Prince Bernhard is having a meeting at Barbizon, continuing his exploration looking toward improving European and American relations.

If personally you can fit such a trip into your schedule, I suggest you find the money and go to France. (govt)

DE

D.D.E.

On official White House stationery, President Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote a memorandum (shown above) to his then-administrative assistant, Gabriel Hauge, making reference to the upcoming Bilderberg Conference in Barbizon, France. (Note that he does not use the term "Bilderberg," however, inasmuch as the annual conference had not yet adopted the name.) The president suggests that Hauge "find the money and go to France." Then, in his own handwriting, the president amended the memo and next to the reference to money he added "(govt)"—that is, "government." In other words, he was suggesting that Hauge come up with taxpayers' money to finance his trip to the Bilderberg meeting. This alone suggests that despite Bilderberg claims to the contrary, American taxpayers' dollars—not to mention the tax dollars of other nations—are used to promote the Bilderberg agenda. On the two pages which follow the memorandum shown above are exact photoreproductions of Hauge's report to the president of the events of the Bilderberg conference in France. Note that Hauge concludes his memorandum with a number of intriguing direct quotations from statements made by Bilderberg attendees, although he is careful not to reveal the names of those who made the remarks quoted—this in keeping with what we shall see is official Bilderberg policy. And bear in mind, of course, that Hauge was undertaking this venture at the expense of the American taxpayers who were not privy to the events taking place inside this international conclave of elitists.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I promised to set down for you some of the highlights of the Barbison Conference on competitive coexistence between Communism and the Free World as it relates to the uncommitted peoples.

Status reports on Communist strength in various countries included these items:

In SWEDEN there is no correlation between poverty and the small Communist group there; rather the correlation is with certain fringe religious movements. There is some attempt by the Communists to infiltrate the unions in the Bofors factories.

In NORWAY Communist strength has weakened recently and is confined now pretty much to the northern provinces where conditions are generally poor and where there is a boundary with Russia.

In BELGIUM Communist influence was described as weak and as existent principally among Italian and Yugoslav workers imported into Belgium to do the least desirable kinds of work.

In ITALY the Communists were reported to have about 5 million votes. This represents an increase since 1948 when the Italian Communist party had to bear the burden of the fact that Tito and Yugoslavia were then good Communists. Communist influence is strongest among the well-off workers in Turin and Milan and among the prosperous farmers in Tuscany. It does not seem to appeal to the poverty-stricken peasants in Calabria, for example, where monarchist sentiment is strong. The virtual stoppage of emigration to the

U. S. was reported as a powerful propaganda factor for the Communists. It is estimated that \$200 million is now being spent annually by the Communist party in Italy. The U. S. was charged by an Italian delegate with certain responsibility for the fastening of Communism upon Italy because of our insistence immediately after the war that Communist ministers be included in the government. The U. S. High Commissioner at that time was reported by this delegate to have said he did not care whether Italy went Communist or not.

In HOLLAND there is a Communist trade union which is regarded as a good thing and helpful in keeping the situation under surveillance.

In PORTUGAL Communism is reported as no problem for the following reasons: a) the country has never had any diplomatic relations with Russia and therefore Russia has had no embassy base from which to operate its propaganda; b) the trade unions are a controlled part of the state and hence Communists cannot easily operate in their leadership; c) the police are effective; d) the people are deeply religious. The way Communists are treated is illustrated by the fact that when Russian ships come for cork, their crews are not permitted to land.

In the UNITED KINGDOM Communism was reported as not a political issue, merely as a security issue.

During the course of the discussion these general points, and in some instances conclusions, emerged:

There was discussion as to whether free world propaganda was hindered by the failure to have what one delegate called a "Democintern" as a counterpart to the Comintern. Discussion on this point was inconclusive and turned finally to the possibility of invoking Article II of the NATO Pact which provides for cooperation in non-military fields.

In the opinion of a Dutch delegate, the growth of the united Europe movement was the factor which has produced from the Russians considerable initiative in sports and cultural

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exchange. By this program they hope to gain acclaim of Europeans. There was a consensus in the group that the sports and cultural exchanges should be fostered, provided that appearances by the Russians in Western countries are not under auspices they select but under auspices we select.

A Dutch delegate presented an analysis of the psychological factor among the underdeveloped peoples of the Far East as being one basis for their disposition to listen to the Communists. He described a state of psychological revolt and rebellion against the fact that what they regard as their spiritual superiority is unavailing as against the material superiority of the West. They indulge this psychological feeling by resentment against their former political overlords of the West and against rich America that wants to do business with them on a basis which they regard as factual inequality. The delegate referred to this psychological situation as a "psychic trauma."

There was a disposition in the group to approve a cultural conference between representatives of the East and the West in an effort to get to the intellectuals who were reported to be largely against us or neutralist in attitude.

Considerable discussion revolved around legal measures to deal with the Communist party and its apparatus. Part of the U. K. delegation and all of the Dutch delegation were strongly for such measures. The French and Italians were against them, saying that Communists should be dealt with not as traitors but as Communists. There was a sense of unbelief that Europe's free societies lacked the vitality to deal with these people except with police state methods.

An English delegate made the observation that the Soviet has not yet tried much economic aggression, but he anticipates that we are on the threshold of an era of economic warfare to be launched against us by the Communists especially in the underdeveloped areas of Asia.

Great emphasis with respect to the Asian problem was

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placed on the diluting effect on economic progress originating in population increase. A Swedish expert stated that 40 years from now there will be one billion Chinese and 700 million Indians (U. S. Population then would be in the range of 275-300 million). While there was a good deal of pessimism about the diluting effect of population on economic improvement in the Far East and hence upon expectations from economic aid programs, the conclusion strongly emerged that these uncommitted people must not make their choice between Communism and the free world in an economic environment of economic stagnation or decline. That, in itself, would constitute an adequate basis for whatever assistance could usefully be given. This conclusion emerged despite a widespread feeling that the cold war decision would probably be made before appreciable economic improvement in these areas could be brought about.

A Dutch delegate asserted that there was need for the establishment of a sociological research center in connection with any economic assistance program for the Far East to seek better understanding of what these people really want and how they may be aided in getting it.

It was interesting to observe in these discussions how various Europeans, who have their assorted gripes against the U. S., time after time cited our country and our economy as evidence of what the free way of life could produce in contrast to the Communist.

An English delegate asserted that Asians should not be asked to commit themselves either to the Communists or to us but merely helped to develop themselves.

An American delegate stressed the need for development in non-economic lines. For example, he said that one of the greatest threats in the Philippines today is the fact that 108,000 college graduates are without jobs.

A Swedish delegate quoted Communist propaganda in that country as raising the question, "Are you against the H-Bomb? If so, you should be with us."

The Swede suggested that the reply to that attack is for leading citizens of the West constantly to refer to the proposals we have made for atomic control and to President Eisenhower's atoms-for-peace plan.

A Swedish delegate quoted the Communists as raising the question, "Is it easier to get into the U. S. A. or the U. S. S. R.?"

In replying to Communist charges that the West is responsible for the cold war, a Swedish delegate said that their reply was to point to the reduction in arms by the Allies after the war and the failure of Russia to do the same. He has found this effective.

A French Socialist delegate stated that the principal propaganda claims in his country were that the Communist party removed class barriers, produced greater equality, abolished privileges and sought to replace the system of capitalism which causes wars and unemployment.

The French replies have pointed out that Russia is not a Communist state but is operated on the basis of state capitalism; that one and a half million Russians exploit 190 million; that young people cannot go to the universities in Russia unless they are approved by the Communist leaders; that free science, free art and free literature is impossible -- witness the rejection by Stalin of Picasso's portrait of him; some of the worst race discrimination in Europe is in the satellite states; workers in unions should be free to fight the state, free to quit their jobs if they wish.

Striking quotations from the days' discussions included these:

"Communists play the role of innocents pursued by the evil state with foul means."

- Norwegian delegate

"Technical assistance experts representing international bodies such as the International Bank encounter less resistance from people in the underdeveloped countries than do the same individuals coming as nationals from their own countries."

- American delegate

"I believe industrialists should go as far socially as it is possible to go economically."

- Italian delegate

"The function of the state is to provide liberty and opportunity to the ambitious and security to the unambitious."

- German delegate

"The side that equips India with machines will win the cold war."

- Belgian delegate

PHOTO COPY

"Neutrality is nationalism with an inferiority complex."

- English delegate

"International law is nineteenth century British foreign policy."

- American delegate

"Communists are neither to the right nor to the left, but to the East."

- French delegate

"Nobody is worth over £2,000 per annum."

- Nehru, as reported by an English delegate

"Communists assert 'a monopoly of hope.'"

- Italian delegate

"Most neutralists are really pro-Russian."

- French delegate

"There is evidence that Nehru has been somewhat shaken by reports of Soviet colonialism in their satellite countries."

- Belgian delegate

"The French Assembly is to the left, but the French wallet is to the right."

- French delegate

"The coincidence of Nationalism and Marxism is a vital fact of our day."

- English delegate

"The West should offer underdeveloped countries 'association' instead of 'assistance.'"

- Belgian delegate

"The struggle between the French Assembly and the French Government turns on the question of whether the former will give the latter enough authority to meet national as against local issues."

- French delegate

"Nationalization of industry in Europe so far has been merely a socialization of losses."

- German delegate

"Only the intelligent can bear the burden of being grateful."

- French delegate

Gabriel Hauge

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


March 30, 1955.

Dear Gabe:

Many thanks for your highly informative and interesting report on the highlights of the recent Barbizon Conference. I hope you won't mind if I both plagiarize and quote you.

With warm regard,

As ever,



The Honorable Gabriel Hauge,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Shown above is President Dwight Eisenhower's acknowledgment of his executive assistant's report on the Bilderberg conference in France. Note, in particular, Eisenhower's comment that "I hope you won't mind if I both plagiarize and quote you." In other words, Eisenhower intended to incorporate Bilderberg thinking and philosophy into his own private and public addresses. Yet, to the best of anyone's knowledge, although Eisenhower's foreign policy ventures often reflected the internationalist "one world" outlook of the Bilderberg Group and the Council on Foreign Relations (of which his assistant, Hauge, later emerged as an officer) the president never once attributed any of his policies to the influence of the Bilderberg Group nor, so far as is known, did he ever mention the group in public by name.

BILDERBERG CONFERENCE

ST. SIMONS ISLAND
(U. S. A.)

15-17 February 1956

NOTICE TO PARTICIPANTS

Shown above and on the next two pages are exact photoreproductions of the official "notice to participants" attending the Bilderberg Group conference held on St. Simon's Island off the coast of Georgia on February 15-17, 1957. As befitting the highly-organized gathering that it is, Bilderberg officials provided detailed travel arrangements and other pertinent information to the invitees. By this time the group had officially adopted the name "Bilderberg" as its moniker.

Place of the Conference

The Conference will be held in the King and Prince Hotel, St. Simons Island, near Brunswick, Georgia (U.S.A.).

Telephone number : 5411 St. Simons Island, Georgia.

Accommodation

Rooms, meals and beverages at the King and Prince Hotel will be free of charge to participants.

All extras, such as telephone calls, telegrams, laundry and valet service, will be at the delegates' own expense.

In the event of participants being accompanied by members of their family or their staff, the latter may be accommodated at their own expense in the neighborhood of St. Simons Island. The Secretariat of the Conference will be pleased to help with the necessary arrangements on request.

Whether these arrangements are made through the Secretariat or directly, they must be made not later than the first week of January.

Programme

It is earnestly hoped that the participants will arrive the day before the Conference opens, i.e. Thursday, 14 February, so that the sessions can start punctually on Friday, 15 February, at 10 a.m. Meetings will be held every day both in the morning and in the afternoon, and their hours will be announced as usual at the end of each session.

Participants will be able to leave either on Sunday evening, the 17th, or preferably on Monday morning, the 18th.

No entertainment necessitating evening dress is foreseen.

Languages

The official languages of the Conference will be English and French. All documents will be translated into one or the other of these languages and simultaneous interpretation will be provided during the meeting.

Transport

A schedule of trains and airline flights between New York, Washington, and Brunswick is given below.

a) *European participants* are expected to make their own transatlantic travel arrangements. In view of the length of the journey they should be ready to leave New York or Washington for St. Simons Island not later than noon on Thursday, 14 February.

The organizers of the Conference will, on request, arrange and provide free of charge accommodations in New York for the night of Wednesday, 13 February, and for a night following the return from the Conference. They will also provide the necessary additional accommodations for those whose transatlantic travel arrangements require them to arrive in the United States a day or so early or to leave a day or so late. Transportation from the place of arrival in the United States in St. Simons Island and return will be provided free of charge by the organizers, by train, commercial airline or private plane.

b) *Canadian and American participants* are expected to make their own travel arrangements, but to notify the Secretariat in New York of their travel plans well in advance.

c) *All participants* making their own travel arrangements should do so early as travel is very heavy at this season.

Secretariat of the Conference

Prior to the Conference, all American participants should address correspondence concerning the Conference to :

Mr. Joseph E. Johnson

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
U.N. Plaza — 46th Street — New York 17, N.Y.

Telephone number : OXford 7 - 3131.

Cable address : INTERPAN.

All European participants should communicate on all Conference matters with :

Dr. J. H. Retinger

27, The Vale — London - S.W.3

Telephone number : FLAXman 0676.

Telegraphic address : Beretiger London.

During the Conference, i.e. from 15 to 17 February, the Secretariat will be established at :

The King and Prince Hotel,

St. Simons Island — Georgia (U.S.A.).

Telephone number : 5411 St. Simons Island, Georgia.

Air and Rail Connections

NEW-YORK CITY, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND BRUNSWICK, GEORGIA

New York City to Brunswick, Georgia - Air :

Leave New York City (Idlewild Airport) via National Air Lines	7 : 30 a.m.
Arrive Jacksonville, Florida	12 : 15 p.m.
Leave Jacksonville via Delta Air Lines	12 : 55 p.m.
Arrive Brunswick, Georgia	1 : 21 p.m.

Or

Leave New York City (Laguardia Airport) via Eastern Air Lines	10 : 12 a.m.
Arrive Atlanta, Georgia	1 : 12 p.m.
Leave Atlanta, Georgia via Delta Air Lines	3 : 10 p.m.
Arrive Brunswick	7 : 38 p.m.

New York City to Brunswick, Georgia - Rail :

Leave New York City (Pennsylvania Station) via Pennsylvania Rail Road	2 : 20 p.m.
Arrive Nahutta, Georgia	6 : 51 a.m.

Washington, D.C. to Brunswick, Georgia - Air :

Leave Washington, D.C. via National Air Lines ..	9:05 a.m.
Arrive Jacksonville, Florida	12:05 p.m.
Leave Jacksonville via Delta Air Lines	12:55 p.m.
Arrive Brunswick	1:21 p.m.

Or

or 5
114

Leave Washington D.C. via Eastern Air Lines ..	11:55 a.m.
Arrive Atlanta, Georgia	4:12 p.m.
Leave Atlanta via Delta Air Lines	5:10 p.m.
Arrive Brunswick	7:58 p.m.

Washington, D.C. to Brunswick, Georgia - Rail :

Leave Washington, D.C. via Pennsylvania Rail	
Road	6:40 p.m.
Arrive Nahunta, Georgia	6:51 a.m.

NOTE: These are the schedules as of December 1956. Schedules are subject to change. Taxis or buses from the King and Prince Hotel will meet planes and trains on which participants are scheduled to arrive.

Air and Rail Connections

BRUNSWICK, GEORGIA, NEW-YORK CITY, AND WASHINGTON, D. C.

Brunswick, Georgia to New York City - Air :

Leave Brunswick via Delta Air Lines	11:55 a.m.
Arrive Jacksonville, Florida	12:01 p.m.
Leave Jacksonville via Eastern Air Lines	5:15 p.m.
Arrive New York City (Newark Airport)	9:50 p.m.

Or

Leave Brunswick via Delta Air Lines	9:14 a.m.
Arrive Atlanta, Georgia	11:55 a.m.
Leave Atlanta via Eastern Air Lines	12:50 p.m.
Arrive New York City (Newark Airport)	5:50 p.m.

Brunswick, Georgia to New York City - Rail :

Bus service from Brunswick to Nahunta, Georgia

Leave Nahunta, Georgia via Pennsylvania Rail

Road	7:26 p.m.
Arrive New York City (Pennsylvania Station) ..	11:45 a.m.

Brunswick, Georgia to Washington, D.C. - Air :

Leave Brunswick via Delta Air Lines	11:55 a.m.
Arrive Jacksonville, Florida	12:01 p.m.
Leave Jacksonville via Eastern Air Lines	5:15 p.m.
Arrive Washington, D.C.	8:17 p.m.

Or

Sun.
1/17

Leave Brunswick via Delta Air Lines	9:14 a.m.
Arrive Atlanta, Georgia	11:55 a.m.
Leave Atlanta via Eastern Air Lines	12:45 p.m.
Arrive Washington, D.C.	5:54 p.m.

Brunswick, Georgia to Washington, D.C. - Rail :

Bus service from Brunswick to Nahunta

Leave Nahunta via Pennsylvania Rail Road	7:26 a.m.
Arrive Washington, D.C.	7:25 a.m.

NOTE: These are the schedules as of December 1956. Schedules are subject to change.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
EITHER IN WHOLE OR IN PART

BILDERBERG GROUP

ST SIMONS ISLAND
CONFERENCE

15-17 February 1957

Following the 1957 Bilderberg Group meeting on St. Simon's Island, Bilderberg organizers issued this member-only summary report shown here and on the ten following pages (in exact photoreproductions of each of the individual pages). Note that the cover describes the report as being "strictly confidential" and "not for publication either in whole or in part." This was the first time that a Bilderberg conference was held in the United States of America.

BILDERBERG CONFERENCES
List of Participants

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NOTE THE NAMES of some of the attendees whose names appear on these just these particular pages: David Rockefeller; Dean Rusk of the Rockefeller Foundation and later U.S. Secretary of State; U.S. Senators John Sparkman and Alexander Wiley and U.S. Representative John Vorys. On other pages appear the names of other leading figures among the world elite who compose the Bilderberg.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN:
H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF THE NETHERLANDS

HONORARY SECRETARY:
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UNITED STATES HONORARY SECRETARY:
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ASTOR, THE HONORABLE F. D. L.
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FRANCE

*) Participants who had accepted the invitation but were eventually unable to attend.

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GORDON, LINCOLN
GOBBINS, SIR COLIN
HAFSTAD, LAWRENCE R.
HAUGE, GABRIEL
HAUGE, JENS CHRISTIAN
HAYS, BROOKS
HEALEY, DENIS W.
HEENEY, ARNOLD D. P.
HEILPERIN, MICHAEL A.
HEINZ, HENRY J., II
HOBBS, LEIF
HOFFMAN, PAUL G.
JACKSON, C. D.
JACKSON, WILLIAM H.
JACOBSON, PER
KENNAN, GEORGE F.
KISSINGER, KURT-GEORG
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KISSINGER, HENRY A.
LIFFTING, PIETER
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*) MENDERES, ADNAN
MENNE, ALEXANDER W.
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MURPHY, ROBERT D.
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FRANCE

PRICE, DON K.
ROBERTS, HENRY LITHGOW
ROCKEFELLER, DAVID
VAN ROJEN, J. H.
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RYKENS, PAUL
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VORYS, JOHN M.
WALLENBERG, MARCUS
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DENMARK
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SWEDEN
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
GERMANY
UNITED KINGDOM
BELGIUM

IN ATTENDANCE:
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NETHERLANDS
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*) Participants who had accepted the invitation but were eventually unable to attend.

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*) Participants who had accepted the invitation but were eventually unable to attend.

5

INTRODUCTION

The fifth Bilderberg Conference met in the USA on St Simons Island, Georgia. It was the first to be held in America. The first four were held in the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Denmark.

Seventy persons attended from twelve different countries; whatever their status or function in public life they all took part in a purely personal capacity. Like all other meetings of the Bilderberg Group this Conference set as its purpose the frank discussion of problems of common concern to the nations of the Western Alliance. Its members were all informed persons of authority and influence in their respective countries. Since difficulties and differences are bound to arise among any group of democratic peoples which believes in the right of dissent, the Bilderberg Group aims at contributing towards a reconciliation of divergent views and interests by providing the opportunity of free discussion among leaders of opinion who share a common desire to achieve a better understanding of one another's motives and intentions.

For this reason, the subjects chosen for discussion at Bilderberg Conferences mainly concern questions on which the Western Alliance may have difficulty in agreeing. Fruitful discussion requires an atmosphere of mutual trust, so that participants can express themselves in complete frankness. This has been largely achieved at all the Bilderberg Conferences because the meetings are held in private, the press and public are excluded and neither background papers nor speeches are published. In the final printed report, like the present one, opinions are summarized and speakers are not quoted by name.

The Conferences of the Bilderberg Group do not aim to formulate policy or even reach conclusions—no resolutions are submitted for discussion or voted upon. The purpose of the debate is to present a comprehensive review of the problems on the Agenda from which each participant is free to draw his own conclusions. It is hoped, however, that as a result those who attend the meetings may be better equipped to use their influence so that the Atlantic alliance may function better.

The main items on the Agenda of the fifth Bilderberg Conference were as follows:

1. Review of events since the fourth Bilderberg meeting in May 1956.
2. Nationalism and neutralism as disruptive factors inside the Western Alliance.

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I. REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE FOURTH CONFERENCE IN MAY 1956

The first day was spent in reviewing world developments over the nine months which had elapsed since the fourth Bilderberg Conference in May 1956 at Fredensborg, Denmark. This period covered the Suez crisis and the revolutions in Poland and Hungary—events which put to the test the aims, methods, and assumptions of Western policy. Leaving discussion of possible future action in the Middle East and Eastern Europe for the following day, the Conference began, as usual, with an inquest on the immediate past.

The Middle East crisis had gravely strained the Western Alliance and in particular had created a breach between the United States on one side of the Atlantic and Britain and France on the other. Various speakers from both sides explained the policies of their respective Governments and parties and the reasons which underlay those policies. Discussion of specific issues and events enabled the Conference to clear up misunderstandings which had been based on inadequate or even false information—for example, the history of negotiations on Western aid for the Aswan Dam, the conduct of the great Powers during the Suez negotiations and the military conflict which followed them. Several speakers emphasized the surprising breakdown of communication and collapse of understanding which had developed between the allies.

The main purpose of the discussion, however, was to analyse and evaluate the past as a basis for discussion of future policy. Though the debate did not aim directly at setting the records straight, by doing so it removed many misunderstandings on both sides of the Atlantic. At the same time it enabled the Conference to make some assessment of the damage done and of the effect on public opinion in all the countries concerned. It emerged that, in Britain and the USA particularly, public opinion was by no means uniform in its reaction. Profound divisions had developed inside Britain on the subject, but most speakers were optimistic about the chances of a speedy healing of the breach.

Several speakers pointed out that the breakdown in diplomatic contact between the Governments was paralleled by a general breakdown of public information. Many cases were quoted of distortion and falsification of the facts, indeed many participants were alarmed to find how far this distortion had gone, and how high it had penetrated into the top levels of public opinion.

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3. The Middle East.

4. The European policy of the alliance, with special reference to the problems of Eastern Europe, German reunification and military strategy.

Background papers were circulated before the meeting to provide information for the discussion or to focus debate on particular issues. Some of these papers covered questions which time did not permit the fifth Bilderberg Conference to reach. Following normal custom, as each new subject was broached, the authors of the relevant papers opened the discussion by commenting upon them.

The Bilderberg Conferences are held throughout in plenary session so that any member may participate in any of the discussions. Advantage is also derived from the opportunities for informal conversation outside the conference room among participants, who spend three days living together in the same hotel away from the distractions of the city. The fifth Bilderberg Conference benefited considerably from the pleasant climate and agreeable surroundings of the King and Prince Hotel which was taken over exclusively for the meeting.

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Numerous speakers described the effect of the Suez crisis on Asian opinion. Several American participants pointed out that the conduct of the United States and Canadian Governments in the United Nations was determined to a considerable extent by their concern with reactions of the Bandung states. One speaker who had recently visited India said that though Russia had lost prestige by her action in Hungary, which showed Asians that colonialism was possible in Europe too, and was practised by the Soviet Union, this lesson was unfortunately obscured by the effect of Western military intervention in Egypt.

This inevitably provoked a discussion on colonialism, on which divergent American and European views have long created difficulties for the alliance. Though it was felt that Europe's record in the colonies was now better appreciated in America, and America's feelings on colonialism better understood in Europe, the fact that the world's coloured peoples still tend to interpret Western policy in terms of colonialism made it necessary for the Conference to take the subject up again. One speaker pointed out that the very failure of Western solidarity over Suez had produced strong favourable reactions among the Afro-Asians, who until recently had taken it for granted that the United States automatically took the side of Britain and France in any dispute which affected them. Several speakers described their experiences in the United Nations and claimed that this assumption was no longer made since Suez.

Throughout the debate all speakers agreed that the West had a vital interest in winning friends among the Bandung peoples, who represented the floating vote in the Cold War. Though most of these countries might describe their position as neutral, this label covered a wide variety of policies among which the West should be careful to discriminate. Several speakers felt that the West must keep as much as possible of the uncommitted world co-operating with it, even at the expense of accepting their military neutrality; in the long run it must be possible to find a basis of common interest on which the West could establish friendship with this increasingly important part of the world.

This led one of the European participants to trace the important role of Israel. Much of the Arab world considers Israel as an extension of Europe into the Middle East—a feeling which, however unfortunate, inevitably results from the fact that Israel, like some states in Africa, contained European settlers. The surrounding peoples resented Israel as imposed on them by force, and feared ultimate subordination to her. This presented the West with difficult problems. Yet in fact the interest of Europe and America fundamentally coincided, because the European settlements in the Middle East and in many parts of Africa were making it difficult for the Western democracies to achieve the right relationship with the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia. Our main interest was to make friends with the Afro-Asians. The speaker deplored attempts to establish

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WITHIN THESE PAGES appear highly provocative comments by the Bilderberg attendees discussing, among other things, "the negative aspects of nationalism" and the role of the United Nations in world affairs. It is very clear that the Bilderberg Group has a particular affinity for the United Nations as a global body which it notes is, while not a "world government," certainly a force for molding world opinion—and that is clearly what Bilderberg Group participants also seek to do.

of immense importance since for the first time it had become possible to mobilize world opinion quickly and effectively against any aggression on the part of the Soviet Union. Before October, the clear-cut division between the West and the neutrals had made this impossible. But the intangible asset of moral force could now be brought to bear on the Western side. In the long run this may be of decisive importance, since world opinion is one of the few means of exerting pressure on the Soviet leaders.

This was one of the reasons why the United Nations was so strongly supported by the American people, who in a recent poll had indicated that only 7 per cent of them favoured America's withdrawal from the United Nations. There were obvious difficulties. The same speaker pointed out that the immaturity and intransigence of the Afro-Asian countries, many of which had dictatorial governments, presented obstacles to American victories in the United Nations—there was no automatic Western majority. Another American speaker felt that though his country was right on the whole in considering the United Nations as an effective framework for solving the Suez Canal dispute and preventing further aggression, and right in giving so much importance to world opinion, both in the short and long run, it should have done more to convince Europe and Britain that this was practical politics.

This led to a discussion on the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. A European participant observed that the real difference between America and Europe on the Suez Canal problem concerned not aims but methods—and in particular the role of force. While America had consistently opposed the use of force unless absolutely inevitable, on the other side there had been a certain predilection for it since both France and Israel were already committed to the use of force. France was fighting in North Africa and Israel had constantly to use force in defending her frontiers. The attack on Egypt was for them a natural extension of a conflict in which they were already engaged.

America saw the problem in a quite different light. One of the speakers remarked that when President Eisenhower took his decision on the matter in October 1956 he was fundamentally concerned with two questions—whether aggression was obsolete as a means of settling a dispute in one's favour and whether it was right and possible to reserve the use of force to the application of a collective sanction within a particular group, whether it be NATO or the United Nations or any other group to which his country belonged. Though it is not easy to weigh the moral content of a policy, he believed that its morality must depend on the answer to these two questions. Commenting on this statement, one of the participants observed that the conditions of diplomacy have changed today since the development with American support of effective world opinion—it was with this that Great Britain and France had finally complied. The fact that

a contrast between the interests of Europe and of the United States by presenting America with a choice between the friendship of Europe and the friendship of Afro-Asia. In fact, Europe no less than America must seek friendship with the Afro-Asians because her primary interest was to prevent the spread of Communism.

What, then, should be the Western attitude towards the emergent nationalism of the African and Asian peoples? Though many speakers emphasized the importance of working with and not against the tide of nationalism, one of the participants pointed out that the concept of national sovereignty could be just as destructive for Africa and Asia in the future as it had been for Europe in the past. The concept of national independence should not be exalted unconditionally as, he said, Americans tended to do—its dangerous possibilities should be emphasized.

Yet whatever the negative aspects of nationalism as a world force, we must accept it as a fact of immense importance; one of the speakers said that for backward countries nationalism represented a short cut to the material standards of the white countries in the twentieth century. Exasperated with the indolence of regimes or social systems which were rooted in the past, they saw a simple choice between Communism and nationalism as a rapid means of progress. It was possible for us to assist them in reaching their goal and we could help them to avoid some of the pitfalls on the way. One of the problems was to transform a negative chauvinism into a constructive patriotism.

This led to a discussion of the role of the United Nations. An American speaker pointed out that the United Nations is not a world Government, nor even a world Parliament. It is simply a world meeting. With rare exceptions it derived its only power from its unique position as a forum in which to mobilize world opinion. Russia's so-called "peace offensive" was deliberately calculated to exploit this aspect of the United Nations. Until the events of last autumn public opinion in the free world was sharply divided on the significance of the Russian peace offensive. Though the West in general took a realistic view, the African and Asian peoples, after a decade of effective Soviet propaganda, tended to take Russian professions at their face value, and see the Western powers as warmongers. This contrast was evident in meetings of the United Nations, but the situation had been changed considerably, first by the demonstration of Russia's real character during the revolt in Hungary, and second by President Eisenhower's declaration that the United States could neither ignore nor condone aggression regardless of its source.

As a result it is becoming easier to achieve unity between the Asians and the Western world on the crucial issue of Soviet aggression. The only power the United Nations possesses is its power to mobilize world opinion. Recent events had been

America was prepared to act according to its basic philosophical principles immensely strengthened the case for observing international law. It demonstrated in the case of Suez that world opinion does not accept the use of force as an instrument of diplomacy. But would the precedent set over Suez continue to prevail if the vital interests of other great powers were at stake? Would the United States herself submit decisions on her own vital interests to the arbitrament of world opinion? If so, this would become a valid rule for all civilized powers and the use of force to protect vital national interests outside the framework of international law would be confined to uncivilized powers.

Though participants welcomed such a development in world affairs as a step forward, many speakers pointed out its practical dangers and disadvantages. To take morality as the only basis for policy involved serious difficulties. As one of the American participants stressed, it called for great humility, and he illustrated his point by quoting Lincoln's phrase "with firmness in the right", which was qualified by the further phrase "as God gives us to see the right".

The assertion of moral principles in international life, though constituting definite progress, was fraught with dangers and difficulties of its own. By assuming a moral position on an issue, a nation risked appearing self-righteous and assuming a "holier than thou" attitude which could be highly irritating to others. It led countries to adopt positions which were contrary to political interest and cause divergencies between allies. Serious contradictions could follow an attempt to solve a delicate and complicated situation by applying sets of principles, since a conflict of principles could arise as easily as a conflict of interests. As one of the participants remarked, when principles are made the only public basis for policy, it often turns out that all parties can equally contrive to produce principles appropriate to the defence of their particular interests.

One of the European speakers attracted considerable agreement when he said that the United States did not look at specific international problems in the light of concrete national interests, because in most parts of the world she had no immediate national interests to protect. There was no real parallel, for instance, to Europe's vital need for Middle Eastern oil, except perhaps America's diminishing reliance on foreign bases for her strategic air power. As a result Americans tend to look at international problems in terms of general principles and take their stand on abstract positions, whereas Europeans look at them in terms of specific national interests and formulate their policy to meet their actual local needs.

This difference in national background helped to explain the disagreement on priorities which regularly flares up inside the Western alliance and which several speakers felt was exemplified during the Suez crisis. Since in recent years the Western powers had been increasingly distracted from their area of common interest in Europe to national problems in other regions where they did not auto-

matically recognize a common allied interest, the East-West conflict no longer assumed such a central importance for them. The Cold War was not the only context in which problems could be assessed, particularly since in many cases individual countries had vital national interests to protect in areas where Soviet penetration played only a minor role.

For this reason, the Western powers should think much more seriously about what their common interests really are, exploiting their areas of inter-dependence to the maximum. Where no immediate common interest could be found, they should try at least to minimize the conflicts between their respective policies. An American speaker took up this point by admitting that many of his countrymen would feel happier about their relations with Europe if they could leave the European countries with the primary responsibility for defending their own national interests. The United States would assume a leading role in protecting recognized common interests of the Western world as a whole, but could not be expected to accept responsibility with the same vigour and enthusiasm on questions which were somewhat beyond its capacity and its will and which it understood less clearly than those of its allies which were directly concerned.

There was general agreement, however, that the fundamental interests of all the Western countries were not divergent, and indeed were often much closer to one another than appeared. Middle Eastern oil was an example. Moreover, the United States was unshaken in its determination to assume the responsibilities imposed by its power.

One of the European participants pointed out that the cardinal feature of the post-war world was that, through the rise of the Soviet Union, of Communist China, and of national movements in other overseas territories, the great European powers had found themselves dangerously over-committed. Whether they liked it or not, they could not hope to maintain the old imperial structure by which they secured their world interests. But if the imperialist structure collapsed without being replaced in time by another which could secure the real needs of Europe and Asia and the United States, Communism was bound to win. Our task, therefore, was to work out such a new international system together, America no less than Europe.

Throughout the day's discussion, there was frequent mention of Eastern Europe. Since these references were mainly related to an analysis of Soviet policy in the area and of the possible Western reaction to it, they will be reported in their appropriate place during the account of discussions on the European policy of the alliance which took place on the second and third days of the Conference.

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influence in the Middle East which their power and proximity might have seemed to offer them. But when they saw the opportunity provided by the Egyptian and Syrian demands for arms they quickly took advantage of it by stepping in with military aid and traditional forms of penetration. They thus succeeded in upsetting the existing balance of power and starting a cycle of events of which we have not yet seen the end.

Another speaker pointed out that the Soviet Union attached such great importance to the Middle East that it was prepared to sacrifice advantages gained in Europe by its policy of relaxation if by so doing it could gain advantages in that region. Russia had centred her efforts on the so-called transit countries Syria and Egypt. This offered the possibility of interrupting Western oil supplies and threatening the prosperity of Western Europe. It was clear that Moscow had found Israel a valuable disruptive element in the Arab world and wanted to keep it so.

The Eisenhower doctrine strengthened the Western hand in Middle East negotiations. This was particularly important since the overall weakening of the Western position as the result of the Suez crisis. Several American speakers commented on the Eisenhower doctrine and in particular insisted that the difficulties it had encountered in Congress had arisen over its novel constitutional features—as a diplomatic instrument it had received almost unanimous support in the United States.

Arab nationalism came high among the problems complicating Western diplomacy in the region. One of the speakers cited the efforts made by Egypt to extend its influence throughout the Muslim world and to infiltrate propaganda and agents not only in other Middle Eastern countries and along the southern shores of the Mediterranean but also deep into Africa. Moreover, the Middle East was a breeding-ground for dictators and for types of authoritarian regime with which, as one of the United States participants observed, the American people were psychologically ill-equipped to deal. They found it difficult to understand or to accept them. Dictators inevitably looked for issues on which they could focus the attention and feelings of their people, but it might sometimes be possible to substitute constructive aims for the negative issues which they were often led to adopt. In other words, chauvinism might be transformed into patriotism. The West must find some technique for handling authoritarian regimes, since the social changes resulting from rapid economic development often created favourable conditions for the rise of dictatorships.

Several speakers felt that the West could strengthen its hand in the Middle East by bringing the Asian countries into play, since their interests in the stability of the area both as a source of oil and as a communications centre were comparable with those of Europe. They could help to moderate the force of Arab

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II. THE MIDDLE EAST

The second day of the Conference was spent in discussing problems of the Middle East and of Western policy in the area. The opening speaker gave a comprehensive review of the present situation with particular emphasis on its political aspect. He pointed out that although Soviet interest in the Middle East might have increased recently because of setbacks elsewhere it was nevertheless a continuation of a traditional trend in Russian policy. Developments over the last two years had offered the Russians new opportunities which they were quick to seize.

The countries of the Middle East had several problems in common. Because they were economically under-developed they had no healthy basis for defensive strength and were vulnerable to various forms of subversion. Since most of them had only recently achieved independence, nationalism was a predominant force. The West, however, should not treat its recent experiences as a reason for considering nationalism as a fundamentally negative force. Nasser was not representative of Middle East nationalism as a whole. In Turkey, for example, nationalism had proved constructive and successful in its impact.

The problem of Israel complicated the scene and although its solution would not remove other difficulties it would at least help to reduce them.

In the past few years Soviet economic aid had created new difficulties. Russian promises were widely publicized and had an impact out of proportion to their tangible results. The West should not make the mistake of trying to outbid Soviet offers; such competition was politically damaging. Moreover, as a matter of sound policy the West should direct its economic aid first to its best friends, second to its lesser friends, and only third to those who were neither.

Russia was concentrating her Middle Eastern efforts mainly on Afghanistan, Syria, and Egypt. The West would be well advised to aim at improving the situation around these countries so as to isolate the centres of infection in the hope that ultimately they in turn would come under the influence of the healthy areas surrounding them. One such attempt at building a dam against the spread of Soviet influence was the creation of the Baghdad Pact; it deserved to be supported and strengthened. By operating parallel to this, the Eisenhower doctrine could play a useful role.

It was difficult to understand why the Russians had not previously exerted the

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nationalism and could help the West to reach a solution of some of the political problems. In this respect it was suggested that we could try to improve relations between Israel and India as well as some other Asian countries.

There was a large consensus of opinion at the Conference that the West must present a united front in the Middle East by co-ordinating its policies. There was also a wide measure of agreement concerning the way in which these countries should be approached. The West should show better understanding of the human problems involved in its relations with the Arabs. It should recognize that they were less interested in the social values of the Western way of life than in the material advantages it might offer, particularly in technical assistance and know-how.

Several speakers urged that patience was essential in the present Suez crisis. Situations like that which developed in Iran in 1951 and was now being repeated in Egypt could not be dealt with in a hurry. A dictator who is impervious to external influences must be allowed to run through his cycle. For a period his personal pride and the demands of his position will render him insusceptible to advice or pressure. The point at which this cycle begins to turn is very delicate and needs careful watching, since a dictator like Nasser might well take desperate measures. For example, there was the danger that if he found himself totally isolated from the rest of the Arab world—a real possibility in view of existing trends—he might throw himself into the arms of the Russians. In the long run time was on our side, since the Arab countries had a vital economic interest in the sale and transport of their oil and their need for trade and production. Several speakers made constructive suggestions which might help in solving the Suez Canal dispute. For example, one participant cited the Rhine and Danube Commissions as a method of dealing with international waterways which might ultimately be applied to the Suez Canal. Several speakers recommended consideration of Western help in building the Aswan Dam, since the Egyptians tended to link this problem with that of the Canal.

Many speakers suggested that rather than attempt a regional approach the West should adapt its policy differently to each particular country so that due account could be taken of the differences between them. In view of the Middle Eastern mentality, it was a political mistake to make no distinction between countries which were prepared to commit themselves to friendship and co-operation with the West and those which preferred to be neutral or even hostile. Our diplomacy would be much more flexible and better adjusted to the complex realities if it were designed to meet the specific conditions in each of the countries separately. To support this view several speakers referred to the differences of interest, history and tradition between the various countries of the Middle East. They based their support for a separatist approach mainly on political grounds.

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On the other hand, an important body of opinion favoured a regional approach—mainly on economic grounds. Irrigation could be tackled only on a regional basis and it was the key to economic development in nearly all the Middle Eastern countries. The same was true of transport and communications and of what little industrial development so far existed. It was also argued that a separatist approach would encourage Arab suspicions that Western policy was based on the imperialist maxim of "divide and rule". A regional approach was less open to these suspicions.

Many difficulties emerged from the discussion of economic development in the area. Besides the physical obstacles to development and the uneven distribution of natural resources, there was a wide range of psychological and political difficulties to overcome. The West could offer suitable help in reducing the acute shortage of technical and administrative knowledge. A further range of problems arose from the social transformation through which most of these countries were bound to pass. Moreover, as one of the speakers pointed out, since the majority of these countries had only recently achieved independence they were still liable to think in terms of their previous condition. For example, they tended to avoid serious consideration of their economic problems as they felt this was the responsibility of someone outside.

The Suez crisis had inflicted severe damage on the economic prosperity of the region as a whole, but once the oil began to flow again the situation should quickly improve, particularly in the case of the oil-producing countries. According to the best available estimates, the expansion of oil sales in the years ahead would bring greatly increasing revenues, in fact within the next ten years the oil-producing countries of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain should receive 15 billion dollars in oil royalties; yet it was calculated that over this period they would not be able to spend more than a third of this amount inside their own frontiers. This would leave a surplus of about 10 billion dollars to dispose of.

Though this could greatly increase the instability of the region it could also be turned to good account if the surplus was used by the oil-producing countries to help in developing their poorer neighbours. The World Bank and the Arab League were at present studying the possibility of an Arab development agency which might play an important part in this respect. A regional agency of this nature would be well placed to help in some of the development schemes which involved more than one country, such as the utilization of the Jordan waters, the resettlement of Palestine refugees, transport and communications.

There seemed to be general agreement that the economic development of the Middle East could best be tackled on a regional basis and by a long-term approach. For this reason economic considerations should play a major role during the elaboration of a long-term policy. In the short run, however, the balance of

opinion seemed to favour priority for political considerations. It was argued that Arab leaders had repeatedly shown that they were prepared to pay a high economic price to achieve political ends, and the excessive damage caused in the blowing up of the Syrian pipelines and the blocking of the Suez Canal demonstrated the small weight given to economic considerations when the Arab leaders were taking political decisions.

In spite of recent reverses it was believed that there was still a sound basis for the development of common interests between the Middle East and Western countries. Each could offer what the other needed on acceptable terms. In this respect the Western countries were better placed than Russia, which could neither provide an equally good market nor offer suitable supplies, particularly of consumer goods. Moreover, the political and ideological implications of co-operation with Russia did not commend themselves to the ruling groups in the Arab world.

III. THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF THE ALLIANCE, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PROBLEMS OF EASTERN EUROPE, GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Throughout the discussions there were frequent references to developments inside the Soviet Union. One of the speakers saw recent developments inside the Communist system as falling conveniently under three main heads. First of all, political control of the system had shifted from the police to the Party level. After the death of Stalin and the subsequent downfall of Beria the Party reasserted its control over the security services. This had considerable importance for the functioning of the Communist empire outside the Soviet Union. For example, it made possible recent events in Poland. In the second place, Russia had resumed friendly relations with Yugoslavia on Tito's terms. In the third place, Khrushchev had found it necessary to make revelations concerning Stalin, whose repercussions proved to be very far-reaching.

As a result of these three developments the Soviet leaders were forced on to the defensive on the home front. They were under heavy pressure from new demands for national and individual freedom. These demands covered a wide range of possible relaxations and there were signs that the Soviet leaders were prepared to consider the more moderate variants. Even in Hungary they hesitated at first to reject the demands outright, and ultimately acted with some reluctance when they felt the situation was getting out of hand.

There was general agreement on the view of several speakers that Soviet difficulties arose from structural defects in the regime and had their roots deep in the nature of the Communist system. The present system of dictatorship by committee already showed serious elements of instability. In many other fields also, the leadership faced situations which could be met only by radical structural changes in the system as a whole.

Some of the greatest difficulties were thought to lie in the economic field. One of the speakers observed that the Soviet economy had to provide simultaneously for industrial expansion, higher living standards and armaments at home, and the development of China and the economic penetration of under-developed countries abroad. This was bound to impose great strains on the Soviet economy. Russia's reserves were not as great as the statistics of industrial expansion seemed

to suggest. It was impossible to compare Soviet and Western economic progress, since Russian expansion took place almost exclusively in the basic industries—in whose favour Soviet indices were weighted—while the West aimed at all-round development in which consumer industries and services played an important part. By limiting expansion to the basic industries, the Soviet leaders imposed a severe burden on their people. Yet, though it seemed that present Soviet policy had nearly reached its limits, any change in the balance of the Soviet economy would bring far-reaching consequences in other fields. For example, it would be very difficult in expanding secondary industries to maintain the sort of central control possible for the basic industries. In any case, it was doubtful whether under the present system Russia's economic development could ever catch up with that of the West. The one aspect of the race which could reasonably cause apprehension was the high annual output of technicians and engineers from Soviet schools. On the other hand educated people were more difficult to deal with and this might in time produce favourable repercussions in the political field.

The basic weakness of the Communist economic system was its inability to evolve and adapt itself quickly to changing circumstances. It had abolished the market forces which performed this function in the capitalist system without yet finding anything to take their place.

Many speakers felt, however, that in spite of economic difficulties Soviet political aims and methods had not changed. Moreover, until recently Soviet leaders seemed as self-confident as ever. For example, they had even given notice of their interest in Latin America. Though the Hungarian and Polish revolutions had reduced Soviet influence in Europe, Russia's total military power was still immense. Some speakers felt that domestic difficulties might increase the dangers of external adventures, since the Soviet leaders might wish to use foreign events as an excuse for or distraction from troubles at home.

The Conference spent some time examining events in Hungary and Poland as well as the situation in Eastern Europe as a whole. It was emphasized that the satellite countries had lost much of their value to Russia, since their military forces could no longer be considered as a net addition to Soviet strength, and Russia had had to reduce her economic exploitation of Eastern Europe so as to prop up its tottering regimes. But even from the ideological and political viewpoint, the satellites were a doubtful asset, since it had been demonstrated that none of the regimes in Eastern Europe would be able to survive without the direct support of the Red Army. The Communist parties alone were no longer adequate instruments of government—or of Soviet policy.

However, there was no sign that Moscow's attachment to its European conquests had diminished. Its attitude towards German reunification was unchanged

and while it was prepared to tolerate the Gomulka regime in Poland there was evidence that it did so reluctantly. One of the speakers pointed out the implications of the fact that in its declaration of 30 October 1956 the Soviet Government had given warning that it would go to war if the West intervened to liberate any of the satellite countries.

For this reason the situation in Eastern Europe was highly dangerous. If further explosions occurred they might well result in a third world war. And it was reasonable to assume that there would be further upheavals in the future. If the Hungarian revolution was repeated in Eastern Germany, Western Europe and the United States might be involved whether they wished it or not. German reunification had therefore become more urgent than ever.

German speakers described the respective positions of their Government and Opposition and pointed out that there were large areas of agreement between them concerning the aims and conditions of a settlement, while their divergencies mainly concerned the method of approaching negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The Conference had an extensive debate on the timing, methods, and objectives of ultimate negotiations with the Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany and the liberation of Eastern Europe. Several speakers put forward ideas and proposals which had in common a reciprocal withdrawal of foreign armed forces from both sides of the Iron Curtain and the creation of a zone between them which would be subject to various security controls. It was possible to envisage a wide range of possibilities both in the geographical limits of such a zone and in the conditions governing its security, such as control and limitation of armaments and a system of international guarantees. The specific proposals put forward in discussion were tendered as examples of a possible solution rather than as the only feasible basis for negotiation. All speakers agreed that many combinations could be envisaged and all would require exhaustive study before they could be exploited. The fundamental principle governing all such solutions was that they should not substantially change the existing military balance in Europe or offer substantially less stability than the existing conditions.

Though the reunification of Germany was assumed to imply free elections in the Soviet zone, some speakers felt that in the satellite countries the withdrawal of the Red Army would in itself produce an internal movement towards greater democracy.

If the existing balance of power were to be maintained and the new situation were to remain stable, there would have to be built-in physical guarantees against the violation of the neutrality of the intermediate zone whether by armed force, subversion, or even by the free choice of peoples inside the area. The present NATO defence strategy would require revision. Some speakers suggested the possibility of an international agreement like that of the Locarno Treaty.

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taking the initiative from the Russians in opposing the presence of foreign troops in Germany.

Though Russia was unlikely to accept such a proposal in the immediate future, its supporters believed that there would be an advantage in laying it on the table for study and negotiation when the time was ripe. It should not become the object of what the Russians call "demonstrative conferences", but should be handled through normal diplomatic channels in which the necessary discretion could be preserved.

Most of the participants, however, opposed the idea of creating a neutralized zone in Europe. Their main argument was that the Russians had no immediate interest in accepting such a settlement, since it would involve surrendering part of their empire. The Russian leaders would find it difficult to face the political consequences entailed by the free decision of countries which had once been Communist to turn democratic. They might be prepared to consider a withdrawal if they could have the assurance that the Communist regimes they had installed would not be overthrown as a result. The possibility of intervention by the Red Army from its positions on the borders of the neutralized zone might satisfy them in this respect—but this would imply that the West did not have foolproof guarantees against a sudden Russian re-entry into the area.

Several speakers considered that if Russia's acceptance of such proposals was improbable, the West would lose more by opening negotiations than it could gain. Experience has shown that it is difficult in multilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union to organize developments that the blame for any breakdown is thrown unequivocally on the Russians. Moreover, the West would lose immediately simply by putting the proposals forward. The prospect of new negotiations would delay the strengthening of NATO and the establishment of the new German divisions. The negotiations might last for many months or even years and it would be impossible to return to the position at which they started. Thus, if the negotiations finally failed the West would have lost much without gaining anything.

Moreover any Western proposals would be rapidly met by Soviet counter-proposals calculated, not to lead to agreement, but to create as much propaganda damage as possible for the West during the period of negotiations. It was easy to envisage the content of such counter-proposals.

One speaker expressed the fear that if a neutralized zone was created in Central Europe the defence efforts of NATO on both North and South wings of the European front would be undermined.

As regards timing, it was pointed out that since the Suez crisis had seriously strained the unity of the alliance hard work for a considerable period would be required to heal the breach. The pre-condition of Western solidarity did not exist

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In view of the risks involved in proposing and negotiating such a settlement it was strongly emphasized that it presupposed a complete identity of view among the allies—above all Western Germany. Moreover, the West could afford to enter such negotiations only from a position of strength. This would mean the reinforcement of NATO and the inclusion in it of a West German army. Any plans or proposals would require careful preparation both in content and in diplomatic handling. The critical importance of these pre-conditions was repeatedly stressed. The main argument offered for proposing some such military disengagement in Central Europe was the dangerous instability of the present situation; the division of Europe and of Germany might easily result in the West's being dragged into a shooting war however much it might wish for peace. Events in East Berlin, Poland, and Hungary had taught us how suddenly and unpredictably such a crisis could develop. One of the speakers pointed out that since Hungary had demonstrated that the West was unwilling to assist in liberating the satellites by force, the West had an obligation to adjust its diplomacy so as to achieve liberation by peaceful means.

There was a prolonged discussion on the relevance of NATO's military posture to such negotiations. One speaker contended that Europe's security depended at present on the assurance that America's Strategic Air Command would inflict atomic retaliation on the Soviet Union in case of attack. NATO's existing and prospective forces were too small to hold a major Soviet advance on their own, yet they were much larger than was needed to serve as a trip-wire to release all-out atomic retaliation. It might be possible and desirable to change NATO's present strategic posture and to develop a military organization and doctrine which would free Europe from total dependence on the threat of massive atomic retaliation. But until or unless this was done the contradictions of our present policy were damaging and dangerous. Because the peoples of NATO did not believe in the possibility of an effective shield against attack, they were reluctant to make the sacrifices required to provide for the forward advance strategy which was official doctrine at present. Indeed, the simultaneous commitment by official spokesmen to the mutually contradictory principles of massive atomic retaliation, forward defence, and liberation, were sapping popular confidence in the alliance. As the immediate danger of war seemed to recede, public opinion could be persuaded to accept the need for increased defence effort only if it had been convinced that no less onerous solution was practicable. If the alliance did not develop a convincing collective approach towards negotiations with the Soviet Union, its members might be tempted to seek unilateral settlement with her. Supporters of the disengagement theory argued that the West would gain considerably even if Russia rejected such proposals. One of the speakers felt in particular that the West was sacrificing great propaganda advantages by not

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at present. We must first of all restore our unity and increase our strength. Moreover, since Russia's internal difficulties might be only at the beginning, it might be in our interest not to rush in but to bide our time in the hope of a more favourable bargaining position later on.

Another speaker argued that Russia's present weakness was a case for strengthening the Western position still further. Some of the opponents of a European disengagement put forward alternative policies which might be pursued. It was pointed out, for example, that the decision to re-arm Western Germany started a chain of events which included the signature of the Austrian Treaty and the Soviet apology to Tito. It was reasonable to expect that when NATO was further strengthened by the actual embodiment of German forces Russia might initiate a new series of concessions.

On the other hand, we must vigorously pursue our efforts for general disarmament in the framework of the United Nations. In the long run the prosperity resulting from our superior economic strength would prove an important weapon. It was already influencing opinion among the uncommitted peoples and was a significant factor in defeating Communist propaganda among the satellites. A European participant stressed the importance of maintaining the right posture towards the Russians and in particular of avoiding giving the impression that we were always prepared to capitulate.

There was much we could do to help the satellite countries within the framework of existing policy. There were also opportunities to carry the struggle against Russian Communism into its own ground. Our diplomacy could gain much if it were accompanied by more effective propaganda.

The debate on military disengagement in Europe led to the related problem of Western defence strategy. One speaker contended that NATO was following too many incompatible lines at once. Western defence still rested essentially on the threat of massive thermo-nuclear retaliation. Foreseeable developments in atomic weapons and their delivery systems should persuade us to revise our strategy. Though any changes were bound to carry considerable risks, persistence in our present policies was no less dangerous. Several participants discussed the problems of nuclear warfare. One of the background papers maintained that the prevention of global war depended on the West's maintaining a deterrent power which could not be knocked out by a surprise attack and on making it quite clear at what point this power would be exercised. Bluff was inexcusable and the aggressor must not be left in doubt. Many participants expressed doubts as to the possibility of limiting nuclear warfare. It was emphasized that nuclear warfare could not be limited unless both sides understood and agreed on the specific limitations to observe. There was wide agreement with a statement in one of the papers that the old doctrine that war is an extension of policy was no longer true.

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It is the prevention of war that is the extension of policy today, and the prize will go to the side which discovers how to achieve the prevention of war in modern conditions on the best possible terms to itself and to the maintenance of its social and political standards of value. Several speakers favoured a thorough reappraisal of Western defence strategy which might lead to equipping the West European countries with atomic weapons and to a closer liaison between strategy and diplomacy.

The Conference agreed that discussion of this topic should be continued at the next meeting of the Bilderberg Group.

PRESS RELEASE ISSUED AT NEW YORK ON 18 FEBRUARY 1957

Seventy European and American leaders yesterday concluded a private and unofficial three-day meeting at St Simons Island, Georgia. This "Bilderberg Group" meeting, chaired by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, covered a wide range of matters of concern to the Western community—such as the Middle Eastern situation, Eastern European developments, and German unification.

While the discussions did not attempt to reach conclusions or to recommend policies, there was substantial emphasis on the desirability of promoting better understanding and more effective co-ordination among the Western nations in dealing with common problems.

The discussions of the Middle Eastern situation, for example, produced a frank examination of the recent differences among the Western nations on the Suez Canal episode. As a result, certain misconceptions in both American and European minds were cleared away. This, in turn, led to a positive approach to the exploration of measures to facilitate the resumption of Suez Canal traffic, to help improve relationships among Middle Eastern countries, to assist the economic development of these countries, and to help safeguard the area from Soviet aggression or subversion.

Considerable stress was laid on the proposition that the Western nations could best help realize these objectives by closely associating their interests in the Middle East with the interests and aspirations of the Middle Eastern peoples themselves. Conversely, there was general expression that more Middle Eastern countries would recognize that their own interests could best be served in the context of closer partnership with the West. It was pointed out, for example, that the Western nations were best able to help Middle Eastern countries undertake irrigation and other development projects, that the West provides the best opportunity for Middle Eastern countries to trade oil and crops for needed capital and consumer goods, etc.

Eastern European developments were approached by an examination of the resurgent efforts of certain Eastern European peoples to obtain a greater measure of national independence and individual freedom. There was general discussion of various peaceful ways in which the Western nations might further help Eastern European peoples realize such objectives.

This, in turn, led to a broader examination of the question of whether further progress could be made toward a more general European settlement which might also facilitate German unification. Considerable stress was placed on maintaining and increasing Western strength and unity, both as an essential deterrent to aggression and as the posture most conducive to realistic negotiations with the Soviet Union. Within this context, it was also emphasized that the West must keep a flexible attitude.

The participants in the meeting came from the United States, Canada, and ten European countries—ranging from Norway to Turkey. They included members of different political parties, representatives of business and labour and education, and some government officials. All the participants were present in a purely personal and unofficial capacity—and no detailed reports of their discussions are published, in keeping with the confidential character of the Bilderberg meetings since their inception in 1954.

This was the first Bilderberg meeting in the United States. Previous meetings were held at the de Bilderberg Hotel in Oosterbeek, Netherlands (May 1954); in Barbizon, near Paris (March 1955); in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany (September 1955); and in Fredensborg, near Copenhagen (May 1956).

COMMENTS ON THE PROBLEM OF THE MIDDLE EAST

By a European Participant

After a few introductory remarks, and having stressed that we should deal as a matter of priority with problems resulting directly from the Soviet threat to the Middle East, the speaker reviewed the principal problems of the area:

Under-development of the Area

Although the degree of under-development varies from one country to another, the problem is common to all Middle Eastern countries and bears both political and psychological consequences. Some under-developed countries which have appreciated the need for a military force have not been able to build a strong army owing to the absence of any sound economic basis; moreover, the economic weakness of the region favours political and psychological manoeuvring at home and abroad.

Since the countries cannot solve the economic problem by their own means, external economic aid and foreign investment are required.

We shall briefly review the main problems of economic aid for these countries.

What Countries Should be Aided?

Political questions cannot be excluded when foreign aid is dealt with. In present circumstances, countries which require economic and military aid fall into three categories: those which have undertaken firm commitments to collaborate actively in the policy of collective security and opposition to Russian penetration; secondly, those countries which, although they have not yet taken firm commitments in this direction, endeavour nevertheless to follow a policy favourable to the countries in the first category; lastly, those countries pursuing a negative and hostile policy towards countries in the first group and their policies.

It seems to us essential that aid should be concentrated on the first group, a reasonable proportion reserved for the second, and the third turned away until they give irrefutable proof of a fundamental change in behaviour.

Experience of recent years has amply proved that indiscriminating aid only increases the opportunities for blackmail by the third group, discourages the

first, and makes the position of the second group more difficult in the face of domestic public opinion.

It has been said that discrimination has an immoral aspect. There can be no good morals in rewarding or encouraging those who pursue a harmful policy. As for the ill-intentioned propaganda which represents discrimination as punishment or pressure, it must be countered by showing that aid stems from mutual understanding and agreement, and is therefore naturally reserved for those with whom agreement has been reached.

Soviet Economic Aid

Until about 1955 economic aid was a preserve of the West, especially the United States—but Russia is now competing in this field.

This has enabled some countries to exercise pressure amounting almost to blackmail with the classical excuse that the selfish and unheeding policy of the West obliges them to seek aid from any source.

A delicate problem arises—how can the Soviets be prevented from extending their grip by economic or military aid?

We believe that a policy of over-bidding must be rigorously avoided, since experience has shown that it has the two disadvantages of encouraging blackmail and giving Western aid the appearance of being solely directed to removing Russia from the field. It is most revealing to observe that in spite of considerable aid actually furnished by the United States, Russia, merely by promises of aid—i.e. by actually expending little or nothing—manages to become very popular. This shows that in countries where the leaders are following a policy hostile to the West, Western economic aid is condemned in advance; and in countries where the leaders hesitate between the West and Russia, the determining factor is not to be found in the aid itself.

In fact, as long as the first-category countries remain under Russian influence or pressure, any Western aid will either be without effect or be refused as an imperialistic manoeuvre. There is thus no point in supplying aid to such countries without previously obtaining change in their policy.

As for the second-category countries, we consider the determining factor to be the choice of the psychological moment for granting aid and the way in which it is granted.

Russia carefully concentrates on the psychological factor. Aid is in fact granted not on economic considerations but purely with a view to capturing public sympathy and attention. The West must therefore show imagination in managing its aid programmes.

It is complicated by emotional factors and as a result countries not directly affected by the problem are drawn into the conflict; and many other problems which strictly have nothing to do with it—the organization of Middle Eastern security against the Russian threat, collective organization for economic improvement of the region, etc.—are in fact affected by the Palestine problem.

It is even suggested that a solution to the Palestine problem is a necessary precondition of any basic problem affecting the security and economic development of the Middle East. However that may be, a solution to the Palestine problem would certainly facilitate a solution of the basic problems I have mentioned. But it is quite wrong to say there can be no solution of the basic problems without a solution of the Palestinian problem. The Baghdad Pact is a striking example of a partial solution to the basic problems which does not affect the problem of Palestine. Some economic progress is also being made. It can in fact be said that any improvement of the basic problems will prepare the ground for a solution to the Palestine problem.

On the Palestine problem itself, my views are briefly these. Several attempts at a solution have failed and even made the problem more difficult. But all progress has been set at naught by the recent events in Egypt with which all Arab countries are virtually associated. Which makes me think that perhaps by choosing the suitable moment and acting skilfully a bold attempt could be made to apply a balanced and imaginative solution to the Palestine problem.

As a sort of appendix to the work of one of our rapporteurs I will now examine the present political situation, first dealing with Russian advance in the Middle East.

Currently, Russia has established three footholds. These are Afghanistan, to be used chiefly against Pakistan and Iran; Syria, to be used chiefly against Turkey and Iraq; and Egypt, to be used against Saudi Arabia and also to some extent against Jordan, Libya, and beyond.

The Russians are best installed and most at ease in Afghanistan, and that by economic aid, military aid, loan of specialists, and construction of airfields and strategic road systems.

Next comes Syria where Russian penetration is not so far advanced but where all the necessary bridgeheads are already established, and the situation is such that Russia can install military bases. Russian arms and specialists are already there and Moscow has the administration well in hand.

A little while ago Russia was better installed in Syria than in Egypt; but nothing is wholly bad, and Anglo-French military operations have at least destroyed a certain quantity of Russian stocks and installations. But stock-piling has restarted.

Does this mean it will never be possible to dislodge the Russians from these

Recent Independence

Countries which have recently gained their independence are under the double influence of their experiences of the recent past and a spirit of nationalism, both of which are favourable for anti-Western propaganda.

It is true that there are countries with long experience of independence, but the emotional atmosphere created in recently independent countries becomes an element which influences their policy towards the region.

The nationalist phase is an inevitable one in the development of the State—but may take different paths. After the Turkish war of independence thirty-three years ago, Communist nationalism developed in a realistic direction, consolidating the international position of Turkey and its existence within its national frontiers. But Turkey has a long tradition of independence, so that the case of Pakistan may be a more typical example of constructive nationalism.

What is rather vaguely known as pan-Arabism, or Arab nationalism, is exploited by Nasser for his own ends. These activities of the Egyptian dictator strangely enough coincide with the way Moscow is exploiting Arab nationalism. In fact, nationalist conduct leads to the isolation of the Arab world, to general upheaval in the Middle East, the extinction of the various individual Arab countries to become a single country, and finally the creation of a schism between East and West. These are exactly the aims of Moscow.

The slant which Nasser seeks to give to Arabism must not lead the rest of the Middle East, and of the world, to fight Arab nationalism, since in reality Nasser is not the Arab League, nor does the Arab League represent all Arab countries.

It is Nasser himself and his way of exploiting Arab nationalism which must be countered and that for the good of the Arab world itself.

Note too, that in the Arab world, disapproval of Nasser's conduct is growing each day. This brings growing indignation both at his ambitions of domination, and at the unwisdom for installation of Russian influence on the banks of the Nile and its extension to other parts of the Middle East, especially Syria.

Among Middle Eastern trends, we should note Islamism. Here again there are two tendencies: one, to exploit Islam as a sort of nationalist element, a weapon to fight the West extending beyond the area to the Far East; the other sees in it another means for drawing the countries of the area together, where a community of interests already exists. The first tendency is harmful to the interests of the Muslim countries themselves and is doomed to failure.

The secular traditions of Atatürk are gaining ground every day in the Middle East and this is in the fundamental interest of Islam.

The Palestine Question

The Palestine question cannot be ignored when dealing with the Middle East.

footholds? That depends on us. If we manage to improve the situation around these countries they will themselves react in the desired way.

As to the countries on the periphery, Lebanon is sound. If it does not declare itself openly on our side, it is because of its geographical position and its weakness. We can be optimistic about Saudi Arabia. The visit of King Ibn Saud and the speeches and press comments attending his visit are sufficient comment. Libya is on the right road. The awakening to the false Arabism and false Islamism of Nasser is satisfactorily established in this country and beyond, in Tunisia, Morocco, the Sudan, Ethiopia too is sound.

So the situation is not too bad. We must help those countries which have taken or are about to take the right road.

Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine

I am full of praise for the Baghdad Pact.

The first attempt at collective security after the Second World War was MEDO. This was an attempt encouraged from outside which began with Egypt. But it immediately became apparent that the other Arab countries must also be associated with it, and an effort was immediately made to do this. Thus it was an attempt at collective organization inspired from outside aimed at including the whole Middle East. The effort met with failure but attempts have been continued.

The only formula which has succeeded has been the Baghdad Pact. This is the best solution because it is a local undertaking, because it contains the Western Powers which have the means and the will to contribute and without which contribution no arrangement can be strong and effective, and because all the partners are equal.

Thus, in this Pact, military and economic aid is distributed anonymously on a basis of perfect equality. This is important because if a great power wished independently to aid this or that country in the Middle East, then Imperialist, Colonialist, and what-have-you motives would be ascribed to it. In the Baghdad Pact an idea is achieved and its activities go by the touchstone of joint free will.

In both its aims and its methods the Baghdad Pact is the NATO of the Middle East. That is why Turkey is agitating for the establishment of some suitable link between the two organizations, and not only between these two but also between the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, since in Turkey there is a firm conviction that collective security should take the form of a united and unbroken front; failing that, all the value of the security organizations would be damaged by the gaps between them.

The Baghdad Pact is in fact the backbone of the Middle East.

As to the Eisenhower doctrine, my country is whole-heartedly associated with the enthusiastic reception accorded to it. This doctrine is based on precisely the same ideas as the Baghdad Pact and consequently it strengthens the Pact. Without wishing to push the official interpretation, I would say that the Eisenhower doctrine is the United States' contribution to the Baghdad Pact. Let us await events to see how far and in what way this doctrine will bear fruit.

GORDON ALLOTT
COLORADO

COMMITTEES:
Labor and Public Welfare
Internal and External Affairs

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 24, 1957

Honorable Gabriel Hauge
Administrative Assistant to
The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hauge:

I am enclosing herewith a letter from one of my constituents concerning what he describes as a secret meeting of men in the top level of politics of several nations.

I do not question the right of anyone else to meet with anyone else at any level, but because your name has been brought into this letter, it occurs to me that you might wish to give me some information on which I can base a reply to him.

With very best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Gordon Allott
Gordon Allott, U.S.S.

GLA:cks

Following the 1957 Bilderberg conference on St. Simon's Island off the coast of Georgia, America's famed populist columnist, Westbrook Pegler, wrote a column in which he exposed the meeting. As a result, angry Americans wrote their lawmakers in Washington and demanded answers. At left is an exact photoreproduction of a letter sent by Sen. Gordon Allott (R-Colo.) to Gabriel Hauge, assistant to President Eisenhower, asking for answers about Bilderberg. Below (left and right) is Hauge's somewhat flippant response to Allott explaining that the Bilderberg meeting was nothing to worry about and that media reports were, in his words, a "Peglarized fairy tale." The friendly media reports noted by Hauge appear on the following page.

St. Simon's

L. JACK MARTIN
CARDEN

May 25, 1957

Dear Gordon:

In reply to your letter of May twenty-four concerning the letter of Merle B. Judkins of Denver, let me supply certain information for your use in a letter to him.

Judkins' letter is based on, and is in effect a paraphrase of, two articles by Westbrook Pegler sometime during the first half of April. Pegler in his column provided a somewhat lurid account of this sixth session of the so-called Bilderberg Conference, which was held at the King and Prince Hotel on St. Simon's Island, near Brunswick, Georgia in February.

The Bilderberg Conference is an informal group of private citizens and public officials in their capacity as private citizens, which has met intermittently for the last three years in an effort to analyze and ameliorate frictions among the nations of the Atlantic community. The first session was held at Bilderberg in Holland in 1954 under the chairmanship of Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands. The last session, in Georgia, was the sixth meeting. I have attended five of them and have found them a very interesting and useful opportunity to exchange views with leading individuals from the countries of the Atlantic community.

The meeting was private but not secret. The talk about security guards, etc., is certainly a lot of impressionistic romancing. I saw no security guards at the Georgia meeting.

except from time to time a county police car drove by. I imagine the management of the hotel had requested the cooperation of the local authorities to insure a certain degree of privacy for the meeting, in view of the fact that the hotel had been taken over fully for that purpose. None of its facilities were available to other customers during those three days.

As I say, the meeting was private and not secret. A press release was issued at the end of the meeting indicating the broad subjects that were discussed and, as I recall, listing the names of the participants. Congressional members have attended from time to time. At that particular session, Senators Fulbright and Wiley and Representatives Brooks Hays and John Vorys were in the group.

I enclose a couple of clippings, which I would appreciate your returning to my file when you have read them.

I do not know who Mr. Judkins is but I fear he has swallowed a Peglarized fairy tale.

I appreciate your bringing this to my attention and, of course, will be indebted to you for helping straighten out your correspondent.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Gabriel Hauge
Special Assistant to the President

The Honorable Gordon Allott
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY

VIEWS EXCHANGED ON NATO POLICIES

Informal Session in Georgia,
First in U. S., Is Forum
for Leaders of Nations

ST. SIMONS ISLAND, Ga., Feb. 15 (AP)—An unpublished backdoor approach to better relations among nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is getting its first tryout on United States soil.

State Department officials and are meeting in secret for three days for an unofficial but frank exchange of views.

Former Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York, Viscount Kilmuir, Lord Chancellor of Britain; former French Premier Antoine Pinay, and Kurt Kiesinger, top adviser to German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, were among the participants.

Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat, of Arkansas, and Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin, are among Congress members present. Others attending include publishers, among them Arthur Hays Sulzberger, president and publisher of The New York Times, and C. D. Jackson, vice president of Time, Inc.

The meeting is the fifth by an informal association called the Bilderberg group and organized by Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands who is presiding. Previous meetings have been in Denmark, Germany, France and Holland.

Sulzberger said secrecy was to encourage frank discussions by persons whose positions otherwise would restrict full expressions of their personal views. They declined to list those attending.

Bilderberg group members include selected public officials, economists, professors, publishers, industrialists and some labor leaders. David J. McDonald, president of the United Steel Workers, was aboard one of several special planes bringing members.

The group has been meeting twice a year but because of the United States elections skipped its last session.

The hotel was made into a miniature United Nations chamber for the meeting, which will last through Sunday. Electronic translation machines, tiny receivers enabling members to hear proceedings wherever they may be in the hotel and special trunk wires to Washington and New York were installed.

Other Americans recognized on arrival included George F. Kennan, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; Eugene R. Black, president of the International Bank; Representative John M. Vorys, Republican of Ohio, and Gabriel Hauge, economic adviser to President Eisenhower. Most of the ninety-one members are from abroad.

"Spooky," Official, Secret? Not True, Reply To Pegler

By Phillip Swatek
Enquirer Correspondent
WASHINGTON—A meeting on St. Simon Island off the Georgia Coast last February, described as "spooky" and "secret" by Westbrook Pegler, was nothing of the kind, an American official who was there stated today.

Pegler's description of the meeting, "... a weird conclave, as spooky as any midnight meeting of the Klux in a piney wood ..." appears today on The Enquirer's editorial page.

"There was nothing spooky about it," laughed Dr. Gabriel Hauge, who was there, according to Pegler, as President Eisenhower's "mysterious" economic adviser. Hauge is a member of the administration's Council of Economic Advisers.

At the White House today Dr. Hauge said it was "secret" only in the sense that no reporters were present. Ralph McGill, editor of the Atlanta Constitution, and Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the New York Times, were present, but as participants.

Joseph Johnson, president, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York City, explained that it was an informal gathering of 70 leading officials and citizens of the United States and European nations.

The meeting at St. Simon

February 15-17, was the fifth time the group had gathered.

The group's purpose, Johnson said, is to permit an informal exchange of views about mutual problems; confrontation North Atlantic nations.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace "serves as the American financial sponsor," Johnson said, "because the trustees thought it was a worthwhile thing to do. We're the ones who pay the bills."

(A reader wrote him that St. Simon Island was full of "mysterious characters" ... *Enquirer* Service and FBI, too." Westbrook Pegler says on the Editorial Page of today's *Enquirer*, Page 1.)

Concerning the secrecy of the meeting, Johnson said Carnegie Endowment put out a brief newspaper release before it started, and a lengthy one after, telling what was accomplished in general terms and stating who was there.

Describing the meeting as "private and unofficial," the release stated participants covered a wide range of matters of concern to the Western community—such as the Middle Eastern situation, Eastern European developments and German unification.

"... Certain misconceptions in both American and European minds were cleared away" in a discussion of the Suez episode, the release stated.

"Considerable stress was laid

on the proposition that the Western nations could best help realize these objectives by closely associating their interests in the Middle East with the interests and aspirations of the Middle Eastern peoples themselves." It continued.

In addition to several hundred more words on the general subject matter, the release said "the participants in the meeting came from the United States, Canada and 10 European countries ranging from Norway to Turkey. They included members of different political parties, representatives of business and labor and education, and some government officials."

Although syndicated columnist Westbrook Pegler slammed the Bilderberg Group in his hard-hitting report, the Establishment media took a different view of Bilderberg and rushed to assure its readers (in these news reports reproduced here) that the Bilderberg Group was, among other innocuous things, actually "a backdoor approach to better relations" among the nations of NATO. These clippings, from the *New York Times* and the *Cincinnati Enquirer*, are among the very few formal Establishment media reports about the Bilderberg that have appeared over the years (and these clippings actually come from the personal files of a Bilderberg member). Other reports have been few and far between, particularly in recent years. Interestingly, although by all indications it was Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly who was the tourist visiting St. Simon's Island who first called the attention of the Bilderberg meeting to Westbrook Pegler (based upon claims by Mrs. Schlafly in her famous 1964 pro-Barry Goldwater tract, *A Choice Not an Echo*), Mrs. Schlafly, in recent years, has avoided public criticisms of the Bilderberg Group and even went so far as to back George Bush (a member of the Bilderberg-affiliated Trilateral Commission) over his 1992 populist Republican challenger Pat Buchanan who has publicly scored the Trilateralists and the Bilderbergers for their pernicious, anti-American philosophies. Like Mrs. Schlafly, other "conservative" voices such as *National Review* (founded by William F. Buckley, Jr., who attended at least one Bilderberg Group meeting) and *Human Events*, a tabloid with long-standing CIA connections, are loathe to even mention that the Bilderberg Group exists. The latest "conservative leader" to participate in a Bilderberg Conference is William Kristol who attended the 1995 Bilderberg conference in Switzerland. Kristol, who is also a key figure in the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, is now promoting a new internationalist journal called *The Standard* (financed by media magnate Rupert Murdoch) which seeks to influence conservative and Republican thinking—and will do so from a Bilderberg-oriented point of view.

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

THE HAGUE.
SMIDSWATER 1
TELEPHONE 112069
TELEGRAMS BILDERMEETINGS

Confidential

The Secretariate has the honour to
enclose the minutes of the meeting of the Steering
Committee hold at the Bürgenstock in the morning
of May 29th 1960.

The Prince has expressed the suggestion
that members of the Steering Committee, after having
assisted at a conference or at a meeting of the
Steering Committee, should contact as much as
possible their Bilderberg friends from their own
country in order to inform them about the proceed-
ings of the meetings.

A lunch might be appropriate for this purpose.

The Hague, July 28, 1960.

In an exact photoreproduction above is a letter on official "Bilderberg Meetings" stationery noted as being "Confidential." This is the cover letter that accompanied the minutes of the Bilderberg steering committee meeting that were sent to interested Bilderbergers. The 1960 Bilderberg meeting referenced here was held in Burgenstock, Switzerland, the site of the most recent (1995) Bilderberg conference. Note that the memorandum suggests that Bilderbergers "should contact as much as possible their Bilderberg friends from their own country in order to inform them about the proceedings of the meetings . . . [and that] a lunch might be appropriate for this purpose." In other words, it was being suggested that Bilderbergers should quietly advise other Bilderberg "friends" who were not in attendance at the meeting about what transpired and to do it quietly—by word of mouth—at a face-to-face meeting—that is, "a lunch." So much for the Bilderberg "secrecy" that Bilderberg defenders say does not exist.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 10, 1961

EDITH V. SKINNER
PERSONAL ASSISTANT


Dear Gabe:

Thank you so very much for your letter of March 6th giving me the details of the Bilderberg Meeting in Canada. I have now cancelled out my engagements for the 21st and 22nd of April and will plan to stay for the entire Conference.

It was pleasant to talk to you by phone and I certainly look forward to seeing you in April.

With kindest personal regards.

Sincerely yours,


Hugh Scott
U. S. Senator

Dr. Gabriel Hauge
Chairman, Finance Committee
Manufacturers Trust Company
44 Wall Street
New York 15, New York

In this letter (right), then-Congressman Jerry Ford of Michigan sends Hauge his regrets about not being able to attend the 1961 Bilderberg meeting. No problem, however. Ford did attend the 1964 and 1966 Bilderberg meetings and by 1974 became the first Bilderberg Group member to achieve the American presidency. Today (1995) another Bilderberger, Bill Clinton, sits in the White House, having attended the 1991 Bilderberg meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany.

By 1961 long-time top Bilderberg member and former Eisenhower "assistant" Gabriel Hauge had become chairman of the finance committee of the powerful Manufacturers Trust of New York. In this letter (left) Senator Hugh Scott (R-PA) thanks Hauge for details of the upcoming Bilderberg conference in Canada and promises to attend the meeting.

GERALD R. FORD, JR.
FIFTY-DISTRICT, MICHIGAN
WASHINGTON, D.C. ADDRESS:
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN, ADDRESS:
423 CHERRY STREET SE.
GRAND RAPIDS 3, MICHIGAN

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

February 21, 1961

Mr. Gabriel Hauge
Chairman, Finance Committee
Manufacturers Trust Company
44 Wall Street
New York 15, New York

Dear Gabe:

Many thanks for your kind and thoughtful letter inquiring whether or not it would be possible for me to accept an invitation from H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of The Netherlands to join the next meeting of the Bilderberg Group near Quebec from April 21st to 23rd.

I am sure this would be a very wonderful and interesting experience and I certainly appreciate your kindness in thinking of me. However, during the past few weeks our children have been quite ill with scarlet fever. After they had almost recovered, our youngest boy, Steve, had a recurrence which our physician tells us could be very serious. As a result the doctor has advised us to keep him very quiet for the next several weeks.

Because of this and since my committee work and the legislative program is particularly heavy during the latter part of April, I feel that it would be unwise for me to make such a commitment.

I am most grateful for your invitation and certainly hope you will keep me in mind for a meeting with the Bilderberg Group at some future date.

Thank you again and warmest personal regards

Sincerely,


Gerald R. Ford, Jr., M. C.

ml

P.S. When you are in Washington give me a call & I can discuss it with you more fully. J

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

UNITED NATIONS PLAZA AT 46TH STREET NEW YORK 17, NEW YORK CABLE ADDRESS INTERPAX OXFORD 7-3131

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

June 19, 1962

Dear Gabe:

Thank you for sending me the copy of the Eastern Banker with the little note about the Bilderberg Meetings.

There have been a number of unfavorable stories, originally stemming I think from a Swedish newspaper account of the meeting of "multi-millionaires." The AP, in an instance of almost unparalleled irresponsibility, picked this up and the Times and Washington Post printed it. I have just now been shown a copy of an article in the London Observer for 3 June, which is not nearly so critical, although it does start out by speaking of "a curious conclave (that) just ended." It talks about Retinger and the Prince and mentions the Reston piece, so someone must have talked more than he should have.

Frankly, I am a bit concerned about this adverse publicity. It should be wonderful grist for Westbrook Pegler's and/or Fulton Lewis, Jr.'s mills.

The piece you sent is the first one that dignifies me by mentioning my name. But so it goes. I guess we will just have to ride this one out.

Sincerely yours,



Joseph E. Johnson

Gabriel Hauge, Esq.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York

In this rather intriguing letter reproduced above, long-time Bilderberg functionary, Joseph E. Johnson, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, complains about "unfavorable" stories about Bilderberg that have appeared in the media and comments that "someone must have talked more than he should have" and that he is "a bit concerned about this adverse publicity." In other words, a Bilderberg Group member had a big mouth and shouldn't have revealed too much and given "grist" to the critics.

Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Atlantic Policy Studies

Conspectus of Policy Problems:
A Preliminary Outline:

Prepared by Philip E. Mosely

Some Assumptions About the 1960s

I. Strategic assumptions

- A. The development of nuclear-missile power seems to be moving toward a more or less stable condition of nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States; nevertheless, the race for technological gains and strategic power will continue at an intensive rate, and the balance of strategic power may be changed substantially by scientific and technological break-throughs.
- B. By the end of the 1960s Communist China will have an independent nuclear capability and will endeavor to use it to weaken the political prestige and will of other Asian powers and to neutralize the U.S. ability to bring its nuclear deterrent to bear in Asian conflicts.
- C. It is in the U.S. interest to explore all possible ways of organizing and controlling the nuclear-missile power of the West so as to maximize its deterrent power against the Soviet Union and Communist China and to promote maximum unity of political planning and action by the major free-world powers.
- D. The Soviet Union and China will maintain a superiority of conventional forces, plus, in the Soviet case, powerful tactical nuclear armaments, in order to be ready to use its strategic weight to effect political gains in areas adjacent to their territories.
- E. The Soviet Union will be prepared to promote subversive political and guerrilla action wherever favorable opportunities appear within the free world.

This "confidential" memorandum to the 1962 steering committee meeting of the Bilderberg Group indicates the close ties between the Council on Foreign Relations and the Bilderberg Group. Based upon all that is known about the CFR and Bilderberg, it appears that the CFR effectively functions both as a "think tank" and as a "mouthpiece" (i.e. a public relations apparatus) for the higher-level elites who attend the annual Bilderberg conferences. CFR members serving in public offices and in public opinion-influencing positions generally carry out and promote the policies laid down at Bilderberg meetings.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
EITHER IN WHOLE OR IN PART

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

by
DR. JOSEPH H. RETINGER

Revised
by
ARNOLD T. LAMPING

April 1962

On this page and on the following four pages is reproduced an official "confidential" and "not for publication" history of the Bilderberg Group as of April 1982, explaining the origins of the group and summarizing its membership and structure. This history was prepared for Bilderberg members only and was never intended for the eyes of the world public. Only media figures such as *Washington Post* publisher, Katharine Graham, among others in the media who have attended Bilderberg meetings, would receive such a document.

BILDERBERG

I. ORIGIN

The idea of the "Bilderberg Meetings" originated in the early fifties. Drastic changes had taken place on the international, political and economic stage. The great coalition which had been maintained up to the end of World War II had, for practical purposes, broken up; the antagonism between the democratic states and the communist countries increased constantly and many of the countries belonging to what became known as the "Western" world felt the necessity of an ever closer collaboration to protect their moral and ethical values, their democratic institutions, and even their independence against the growing communist thrust.

The United States government gave the lead in the economic field when it decided on a plan to aid the European countries to overcome the chaos resulting from four or five years of war and devastation. In June 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall made his famous offer which resulted in the Marshall Aid Program. When Czechoslovakia, a bulwark of Western democracy, disappeared behind the Iron Curtain, it became clear that for the sake of survival it would be unavoidable for the Western countries to join hands also in the military field. N.A.T.O. was set up in 1949 with a view to bring together the United States and Canada with twelve European countries.

It was certainly not the first time in history that the United States had linked its fate with that of Europe; it had happened during both World Wars. But never be-

fore in peace time had an alliance of this scope, been formed, never before had such close military, and to some extent political and economic cooperation been achieved as a long-term policy. The Korean crisis demonstrated how far-seeing the statesmen both in the United States and in Europe had been when they had decided on close collaboration between both sides of the Northern Atlantic.

Political decisions of such magnitude are rarely understood by the public. It is therefore not surprising that the new policy was attacked from the outset by elements in the various countries which saw advantages in sowing discord in the Western ranks. Others, whilst not denying the necessity of some form of collaboration, doubted whether the proper means had been applied. Objections based on nationalistic and isolationist sentiments were voiced and a certain distrust of America grew in Western Europe, paralleled by an identical feeling in America towards the European countries.

A number of people on both sides of the Atlantic realized that unless this tendency were checked at the start, it could have deplorable consequences and lead to a disastrous weakening of the Western position. Some of them determined to try to remove this growing mutual suspicion and distrust.

One of the men who not only were aware of this danger but also understood that measures had to be taken was Joseph Retinger, who may be considered the founder of Bilderberg. In the beginning of 1952 he approached H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, as well as Mr. Paul van Zeeland and Mr. Paul Rykens, with the suggestion that unofficial and private meetings be organised in order to discuss the state of affairs which was causing justified anxiety.

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The initiative was wholeheartedly endorsed and it was decided to form a nucleus in order to study the possibility of arriving at a concrete plan. The following persons declared themselves willing to join: Max Brauer, Hugh Gaitskill, the late Alcide de Gasperi, Major-General Sir Colin Gubbins, Ole Bjorn Kraft, Guy Mollet, Rudolf Mueller, Antoine Pinay, Panayotis Pipinelis and Pietro Quaroni.

Most of the year 1952 was spent in private consultations. The first meeting was held in Paris on 25 September 1952 and was attended by all but two - Mr. Max Brauer and the late Alcide de Gasperi - of the original members of the group.

The European group thus having been set up, the next step was to establish a corresponding organisation in the United States. For this purpose, H.R.H. Prince Bernhard accompanied by Mr. Retinger and Mr. van Zeeland visited the United States. Certain members of the Democratic Administration which was then in office were approached, all of whom, in particular Mr. Averell Harriman, were very interested in the ideas and proposals submitted to them. The newly elected Administration had also to be consulted and several Republican leaders were approached. In each case, the reactions were most encouraging. Owing to the change of Administration and for other reasons it took some time to complete arrangements. Finally, however, through the good offices of Mr. C.D. Jackson and Mr. John Coleman, an American Group was set up.

For reasons of convenience and in order to ensure a flexible procedure, it was decided that each group should choose, within the general framework, its own form of organisation. The post of Honorary Secretary was offered to Mr. Retinger.

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When the American group was formed, Mr. Coleman was elected Chairman*. In 1955 it was thought advisable to appoint an Honorary Secretary for the United States and Mr. Joseph E. Johnson accepted this function.

When Canadians were invited to join, it was decided that matters concerning Canadian participation should be dealt with by the European Secretariat.

The necessary spadework having been completed, the first conference of the combined American and European Groups under chairmanship of Prince Bernhard took place at the Bilderberg Hotel in Holland from 29 to 31 May 1954. Ever since, the name of "Bilderberg" has been associated with the organisation.

II. WHY BILDERBERG?

In the preliminary discussions there was no difference of opinion as to the object of Bilderberg. However, the important question to be decided was how this aim could best be achieved and it was necessary to lay down the general lines which the new organisation should follow.

It was of course clearly realised that improving international relations is primarily the task of statesmen and diplomats through bilateral contacts and at multilateral international conferences. But the scope and possibilities of these official contacts are limited and certainly do not cover the entire field that the originators of Bilderberg had in mind. Besides, statesmen, diplomats and politicians are bound by their instructions: they have to defend specific interests and standpoints, even if personally they do not agree with them. Moreover, the group from

* In 1955 Mr. Coleman had to retire for reasons of health. He was succeeded by Mr. Dean Rusk, with General Walter Bedell Smith as Co-Chairman. Both retired in 1957 and were succeeded by Mr. Arthur Dean and Mr. Henry J. Heinz II.

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which the official negotiators are selected is, of course, restricted. As a rule, they are officials, sometimes members of a government. In discussions of this kind, leaders in other fields - such as finance, industry, cultural affairs, trade-unionism, etc. - have hardly any opportunity to express their views on international problems which are not their direct concern. Finally, it is the object of international discussions to come to conclusions which will commit the various governments. This again restricts the scope of such negotiations.

None of these disadvantages arise from the rules laid down for Bilderberg. Everybody who attends the meetings does so in a private capacity. Even if a participant is a member of a government, a leader of a political party or of an unofficial organisation, he does not commit his government, his party or his organisation by anything he may say in the meetings. On the other hand, he can express his views on all the matters under discussion even if these have no connection with his function or profession.

There is another point to consider. Important official international discussions and conferences are usually targets for journalists whose duty it is to report to their papers and magazines. They try, sometimes successfully, to gain and to publish inside information which may create awkward situations. This danger is avoided in the Bilderberg meetings which are of a strictly private nature, so that participants can express themselves freely and in a completely confidential atmosphere without running the risk of indiscretions in the press.

The same confidential surroundings remove any incentive to make personal propaganda; the danger of interminable speeches for the sake of publicity does not exist in Bilderberg.

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Moreover, it should be mentioned that Bilderberg presents a framework that is unique in concept. Anyone who belongs to a country that believes in defending Western ethical and cultural values, and himself shares these ideals, is eligible to be invited to Bilderberg meetings.

Finally, Bilderberg provides a platform where Americans and Europeans can exchange opinions and views. The "List of Participants" contains the names of representatives from the N.A.T.O. countries, from Sweden, Austria and Switzerland and also from various international organisations. Even persons from Australia and New Zealand have attended Bilderberg meetings and on one particular occasion a Pakistani authority attended as an observer.

III. CHARACTERISTICS

H.R.H. Prince Bernhard is the Chairman of Bilderberg. He presides over the meetings of all of Bilderberg's institutions. He appoints on suggestion of the respective committee the members of the various committees and decides after consultation with the members of the Steering Committee who will be invited to the Conferences. The Prince has no deputy, but he is assisted and advised by a small staff composed of an Honorary Secretary General for Europe and his Deputy as well as an Honorary Secretary General for the United States.

From the outset it has been the intention to have Bilderberg remain a loosely knit association without rules of procedure, or terms of reference except those dictated by experience.

Bilderberg is not a group in the sense of a club with members, since that would make its structure too rigid

and not sufficiently adaptable to discuss subjects of varied nature.

For this same reason, invitation to one conference does not imply a standing invitation to subsequent meetings. On the other hand, the name of every person who has ever attended a meeting, is permanently inserted in the "List of Participants".

A nucleus of persons belonging to the Steering Committee, to be discussed below, is invited to all meetings; in addition, it is customary to invite to every conference persons who for different reasons can be expected to make a valuable contribution to the discussions. Since subjects of ever changing nature are being discussed at the various meetings, different persons have attended each meeting. In this manner, the circle of participants has steadily been enlarged and diversified. Moreover, the system has the advantage that younger people can regularly be included in the list of participants which to-day counts 327 names belonging to 16 countries and 8 international organisations.

Bilderberg is not meant as a policy-making body. Its aim is to reduce differences of opinion and conflicting trends among countries and to encourage understanding, if not always agreement, by hearing and considering the various points of view and trying to find a common approach to the major problems on which the various countries of the Western World may disagree. Direct action has never been contemplated, the object being to draw the attention of people in responsible positions to Bilderberg's findings.

Though general conclusions may be drawn, there is no voting nor are any resolutions passed.

IV. PARTICIPANTS

It is obvious that the success of such an arrangement depends primarily on the level of the participants. Therefore only influential and universally respected people are invited, who through their special knowledge or experience, their personal contacts and their influence in national and international circles can help to further the objects set by Bilderberg. They should have no obvious nationalistic bias or prejudices, and be broad-minded when discussing other people's problems or standpoints even if these may differ from their own. And last but not least participants should be animated by the highest public spirit. It has been the aim to attract as participants people from as many different circles as possible.

V. CONFERENCES

The conferences are, of course, Bilderberg's most important activity. This was clearly expressed, when, in 1960, the name "Bilderberg Group" was changed to "Bilderberg Meetings".

The conferences have been held at irregular intervals. In the beginning, they were relatively frequent. By March 1959 it was felt that in general it was no longer necessary to hold more than one conference a year.

So far as practicable, it is customary to hold the conferences in a different country each time. The first conferences were held in Europe, but in 1957 it was decided that, if possible, every fourth conference be held on the American side of the Atlantic in order to provide a convenient opportunity for more American and Canadian

participants to attend such a conference. So far, ten conferences have been held:

1. 29-31 May 1954
Bilderberg, Oosterbeek, The Netherlands
2. 18-20 March 1955
Barbizon, France
3. 23-25 September 1955
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany
4. 11-13 May 1956
Fredensborg, Denmark
5. 15-17 February 1957
St Simons Island, United States
6. 4-6 October 1957
Fuggl, Italy
7. 13-15 September 1958
Buxton, United Kingdom
8. 18-20 September 1959
Yesilkoy, Turkey
9. 28-29 May 1960
Bürgenstock, Switzerland
10. 21-23 April 1961
St-Castin, Canada.

In order to establish a closer contact between participants outside, as well as during the formal meetings, it is considered of the utmost importance to hold the conferences in a hotel in a secluded position and which is at the exclusive disposal of the participants during the

conference. It has always been possible for the host-country to comply with this wish.

For reasons mentioned above the press is not admitted to the meetings, publicity being restricted to a very short general press-statement issued at the end of every meeting. These statements contain no details and do not mention any participant by name.

A certain balance in the composition of the participants is aimed at for each meeting, so that it will reflect as much as possible the general opinion prevailing in the different countries with regard to the subjects to be discussed. Although no hard and fixed rules exist in this connection, it may be said that roughly one third of the persons invited to a meeting are politicians and statesmen, one fifth businessmen, the remainder consisting of professional men, intellectuals, trade-unionists, diplomats, officials and other leaders of public opinion. The number of participants in the meetings has varied between 39 and 76.

The agendas of the conferences have covered the most important international problems of a political, economic or military nature in so far as they were of topical interest at the time of the meetings. The subjects to be discussed are mostly introduced by rapporteurs who have prepared papers on the subjects which are circulated before the meetings.

The subjects chosen for the agenda of the first conference were:

1. The attitude of Bilderberg towards:
 - a) Communism and the Soviet Union;
 - b) Dependant areas and peoples overseas;
 - c) Economic policies and problems;
 - d) European integration and the European Defense Community.

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The choice of these subjects has proved successful and farsighted. The agendas of subsequent meetings all contained items which in some way or other were connected with the four subjects dealt with at the first meeting. They were:

2. Communist infiltration in various Western countries. Western policy towards the uncommitted peoples:
 - a) Political and ideological aspects;
 - b) Economic aspects.
3. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The political and strategic aspects of atomic energy. The reunification of Germany. European unity. The industrial aspects of atomic energy. Economic problems:
 - a) East-West trade;
 - b) The political aspects of convertibility;
 - c) Expansion of international trade.
4. The causes of the growth of anti-Western blocks, in particular in the United Nations. The role played by anti-colonialism in the relations between Asians and Westerners. A common approach by the Western world towards China and the emergent nations of South and East Asia. The Communist campaign for political subversion or control of the newly emancipated countries of Asia. How best the West can meet Asian requirements in the technical and economic fields.
5. Nationalism and neutralism as disruptive factors inside the Western Alliance. The Middle East.

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The European policy of the Alliance, with special reference to the problems of Eastern Europe, German reunification, and military strategy.

6. Modern weapons and disarmament in relation to Western security.
 - a) The impact of technological progress in armaments in strategy and diplomacy.
 - b) Limitation of armaments and its effects on N.A.T.O..

Are existing political and economic mechanisms within the Western Community adequate?

7. The future of N.A.T.O. Defense. Western economic co-operation, with special reference to the political consequences of the existence of separate currency areas within the Western world and to the Soviet economic challenge in the under-developed countries. The Western approach to Soviet Russia and Communism.

8. Unity and Division in Western Policy.
 - a) What are the positive and negative implications of recent strategic developments for the West?
 - b) What are the Western objectives in international economic development and how can we achieve them?
 - c) What are the elements in the evolving picture in tropical Africa that may affect Western unity?

9. State of the world situation after the failure of the Summit Conference. New political and economic developments in the Western world.

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- a) The economic organization of Europe;
 - b) The attitude of the United States and problems of non-European countries.

10. What initiatives are required to bring about a new sense of leadership and direction within the Western community?

- a) The role of N.A.T.O. in the world policy of the member countries;
 - b) The role and control of nuclear weapons within N.A.T.O..

The implications for Western Unity of changes in the relative economic strength of the United States and Western Europe.

In May 1962 a conference will be held at Saltsjöbaden, Sweden, with the following agenda:

- I. The political implications for the Atlantic Community of its members' policies in the United Nations:
 - a) Concerning relations with the developing countries;
 - b) Concerning possible changes in the role and authority of the United Nations.
- II. Implications for the Atlantic Community of prospective developments in:
 - a) The European Common Market;
 - b) The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.

It is impossible to give within the scope of this booklet, even a superficial summary of the discussions of the ten major meetings which have so far been held. It may be mentioned, however, that a final report of the discussions is drafted by the Secretariat after each conference, in

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which the main points of view developed during the meetings are summarised. These final reports are sent not only to the persons who attended the meeting in question but to all participants in previous conferences as well. In order to keep this latter group better informed, the Secretariat introduced a new procedure in 1961 for drafting the final reports: the introductory reports are summarised at length and individual contributions are reproduced in far greater detail, be it anonymously. It is hoped that the new form chosen will meet the wishes expressed in many quarters to have a clearer and more complete picture of the proceedings of the Bilderberg meetings.

The summaries are of a confidential nature. On request, the Secretariat will provide copies of the summaries of one or more meetings, it being understood that the supply is limited.

VI. STEERING COMMITTEE

In 1956 a Steering Committee was set up, composed of persons who had proved particularly valuable to Bilderberg.

On the European side, the founders of Bilderberg were nominated members of the Steering Committee, the late Signor de Gasperi, however, having been replaced by Signor Amintore Fanfani.

In addition, the following persons have become European members of the Steering Committee: Sir Terence Airey, Charles C. Arlotis, Wilfrid Baumgartner, Victor Cavendish-Bentinck, Muharrem N. Birgi, Walter E. Boveri, Hakon Christiansen, Jens C. Hauge, Denis Healey, Leif Hoegh, Eelco N. van Kleffens, Manuel M. Sarmento Rodrigues, Pasquale Saraceno, Carlo

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Schmid, Terkel M. Terkelsen, Vittorio Valletta, Marcus Wallenberg, Otto Wolff von Amerongen.

James S. Duncan is the Canadian member.

On the American side, in addition to Mr. Joseph E. Johnson, the Honorary Secretary General for the United States, fourteen members were nominated: Arthur Dean and Henry J. Heinz II (Co-Chairmen of the American Group), George Ball*, Emilio G. Collado, Gardner Cowles, John Ferguson, Gabriel Hauge, C.D. Jackson, Robert Murphy, George Nebolsine, David Rockefeller, Dean Rusk*, Shepard Stone, James D. Zellerbach.

The Steering Committee numbers 39 to-day. Its members are invited to all the conferences and meetings.

The Committee also met to discuss the various details connected with the convocation of the plenary conferences. Later it was decided that a small Committee would assist the Secretariat in preparing those conferences (vide par. VII). However, all members of the Steering Committee are welcome to attend the meetings of the small Committee.

During the first years, the Steering Committee, at that time composed of about eight members, met sometimes to discuss problems which in themselves did not justify the calling of a major conference and which did not require much preliminary work. On two such occasions it was found desirable to invite also persons, not members of the Steering Committee, to attend these meetings which resulted each time in the attendance of about 20 persons. This contributed to the final extension of the Steering Committee to its present number.

The increase in the size of the Steering Committee, the fact that most problems of general interest had been

* Mr. George Ball and Mr. Dean Rusk have resigned after being appointed members of the Kennedy Administration.

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extensively dealt with at the regular meetings, and especially the fact that the people whose attendance was mostly desired could not afford too frequent absences from their posts, resulted in the decision that in principle the Steering Committee would only meet on the occasion of the yearly major conference.

VII. ADVISORY COMMITTEE

In 1959 it was decided that, in order to assist and advise the Secretariat in organising the conferences, a Management Committee should be set up. At a later stage, the name of this body was changed to Advisory Committee. The following participants, all members of the Steering Committee, were nominated: Wilfrid Baumgartner, Denis Healey, Henry J. Heinz II or George Nebolsine, Rudolf Mueller, Pietro Quaroni and Paul Rykens.

The Advisory Committee meets whenever it is felt necessary, generally in Europe, mostly at Soestdijk Palace. However, a meeting was held in New York in 1961 in order to give the American members of the Steering Committee a clearer impression of the way in which the conferences are organised and, more generally, to ensure a still closer cooperation and understanding between the members of the Steering Committee on both sides of the Ocean.

VIII. SECRETARIAT

The Secretariat is in charge of the preparation of the meetings and, more generally, of all the Secretarial work during and between the meetings.

The first Honorary Secretary was the late Mr. Re-

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tinger, who was assisted by a small staff. When, a few months before his death, Mr. Rettinger retired for reasons of health, a reorganisation took place. Mr. Ernst H. van der Beugel assumed the function of Honorary Secretary General for Europe and Mr. Arnold T. Lamping, former Netherlands Ambassador in Bonn, was appointed Deputy Secretary General for Europe, with one assistant. Mr. Joseph E. Johnson has been Honorary Secretary (later Honorary Secretary General) for the United States since 1955 and he still holds this position to-day.

IX. FINANCE

The running expenses of Bilderberg are very small. Apart from the costs of the small Secretariat, the expenses consist mainly of the costs connected with the Conferences (the expenses of board and lodging of participants being borne, however, by the host-country) and the meetings of the various committees. The whole expenditure is covered by private subscriptions, so that no "strings" - political or otherwise - are attached to the financing of Bilderberg.

X. PRESENT AND FUTURE

It was never intended to carry on any promotional activity, but in several cases ideas discussed at the meetings have led to some specific actions, none of them directly associated with Bilderberg.

Since Bilderberg is not a policy-making body and no publicity is given to the meetings, it is very difficult to evaluate the usefulness of the group and its debates and impossible to claim concrete achievements.

On the other hand, it may be assumed that in taking decisions on problems affecting the interests of the United States, Canada and Western Europe, those responsible will certainly remember and be influenced by the discussions they attended in the confidential and friendly atmosphere of Bilderberg.

BILDERBERG CONFERENCES

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN:

H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF THE NETHERLANDS

HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR EUROPE:

ERNST H. VAN DER BEUGEL

HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE UNITED STATES:

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

HONORARY TREASURER:

PAUL RYKENS

DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR EUROPE:

ARNOLD T. LAMPING

ABS, HERMANN J.	GERMANY
ACHESON, DEAN	UNITED STATES
ACHILLES, THEODORE C.	UNITED STATES
AGNELLI, GIOVANNI	ITALY
AIREY, SIR TERENCE	UNITED KINGDOM
ALPKARTAL, NUREDDIN FUAD	TURKEY
ANDRÉ, ROBERT	FRANCE
ANSIAUX, HUBERT	BELGIUM
ANZILOTTI, ENRICO	ITALY
ARIBURUN, TEKIN	TURKEY
ARLIOTIS, CHARLES C.	GREECE
ARON, RAYMOND	FRANCE

ASTOR, FRANCIS D. L.	UNITED KINGDOM
ATHANASIADIS, BODOSAKIS	GREECE
AUKES, ALBERT G.	NETHERLANDS
H.R.H. PRINCE AXEL OF DENMARK	DENMARK
BALL, GEORGE W.	UNITED STATES
BARBOUR, WALWORTH	UNITED STATES
BASSETT, JOHN W. H.	CANADA
BAUMGARTNER, WILFRID S.	FRANCE
BEAUMONT, GUÉRIN DE †	FRANCE
BEGU, OMER L.	BELGIUM
BEDDINGTON-DEHRENS, SIR EDWARD	UNITED KINGDOM
BETZ, BERTHOLD	GERMANY
BELGE, BURHAN	TURKEY
BELL, ELLIOTT V.	UNITED STATES
BENNETT, FREDERIC	UNITED KINGDOM
BERG, FRITZ	GERMANY
BEYEN, JOHAN W.	NETHERLANDS
BINGHAM, BARRY	UNITED STATES
BIRGI, MUHAMMAD NURI	TURKEY
BIRRENBAUGH, KURT	GERMANY
BLACK, EUGENE R.	INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
BLAISSE, PIETER A.	NETHERLANDS
BLUM, ROBERT	UNITED STATES
BODEN, HANS C.	GERMANY
BOËL, BARON	BELGIUM
BOHEMAN, ERIK	SWEDEN
BOLLING, RICHARD	UNITED STATES
BONVOISIN, BARON PIERRE	BELGIUM
BOON, HENDRIK N.	NETHERLANDS
BOOTHBY, THE LORD	UNITED KINGDOM

BOURRON BUSSET, COMTE JACQUES DE	FRANCE
BOVERI, WALTER E.	SWITZERLAND
BOWIE, ROBERT R.	UNITED STATES
BRANDT, KARL	UNITED STATES
BRAUER, MAX	GERMANY
BROWN, GEORGE A.	UNITED KINGDOM
BROWN, IRVING	UNITED STATES
BRUCE, FRASER W.	CANADA
BRUTELLE, GEORGES	FRANCE
BUNDY, MCGEORGE	UNITED STATES
BURCKHARDT, CARL J.	SWITZERLAND
BURGESS, W. RANDOLPH	UNITED STATES
BUZZARD, SIR ANTHONY	UNITED KINGDOM
CAFIERO, RAFFAELE †	ITALY
CAMU, LOUIS	BELGIUM
CARLI, GUIDO	ITALY
CASE, CLIFFORD P.	UNITED STATES
CAVENDISH-BENTINCK, VICTOR	UNITED KINGDOM
CHRISTIANSEN, HAKON †	DENMARK
CISLER, WALKER L.	UNITED STATES
CLÉMENT-CUZIN, RENÉ	FRANCE
CLITHEROE, THE LORD	UNITED KINGDOM
COCHRANE, SIR RALPH	UNITED KINGDOM
COLDWELL, M. J.	CANADA
COLEMAN, JOHN S. †	UNITED STATES
COLLADO, EMILIO G.	UNITED STATES
COMMIS, PIERRE †	FRANCE
COOKE, B. D.	UNITED KINGDOM
COOL, PIERRE-AUGUSTE	BELGIUM
COWLES, GARDNER	UNITED STATES
CROISILLIER, FRANÇOIS	FRANCE
CROWTHER, SIR GEOFFREY	UNITED KINGDOM
DAVIES, CLEMENT	UNITED KINGDOM

DEAN, ARTHUR H. UNITED STATES
 DEHOUSSE, FERNAND BELGIUM
 DEIST, HEINRICH GERMANY
 DELMER, D. SEFTON UNITED KINGDOM
 DETHLEFFSEN, ERICH GERMANY
 DEWEY, THOMAS E. UNITED STATES
 DIKER, VECDI TURKEY
 DODGE, JOSEPH M. UNITED STATES
 DRAPIER, JEAN BELGIUM
 DUCHET, ROGER FRANCE
 DUNCAN, JAMES S. CANADA
 DUNLAP, CLARENCE R. S.H.A.P.E.
 DUPUY, PIERRE CANADA
 ELLIOT, SIR WILLIAM UNITED KINGDOM
 ENGEN, HANS K. NORWAY
 ERLER, FRITZ GERMANY
 ESENDEL, MELIH TURKEY
 FALKENHEIM, ERNST G. P. GERMANY
 FANFANI, AMINTORE ITALY
 FAURE, MAURICE FRANCE
 FERGUSON, JOHN H. UNITED STATES
 FINLETTER, THOMAS K. UNITED STATES
 FLANDERS, RALPH E. UNITED STATES
 FLEMING, DONALD M. CANADA
 FOSTER, JOHN UNITED KINGDOM
 FOSTER, WILLIAM C. UNITED STATES
 FOULKES, CHARLES CANADA
 FRANKS, SIR OLIVER UNITED KINGDOM
 FULBRIGHT, J. WILLIAM UNITED STATES
 GAITSKELL, HUGH UNITED KINGDOM
 GARNER, ROBERT L. UNITED STATES
 GASPERI, ALCHIDE DE † ITALY
 GEDDES OF EPSOM, THE LORD UNITED KINGDOM
 GEYER, GERHARD GERMANY

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GIBSON, J. DOUGLAS CANADA
 GIDEL, NAH TURKEY
 GOLDEN, CLINTON S. UNITED STATES
 GORDON, LINCOLN UNITED STATES
 GORDON, WALTER L. CANADA
 GRIMOND, JOSEPH UNITED KINGDOM
 GROSS, HERBERT GERMANY
 GRUENTHER, ALFRED M. UNITED STATES
 GUBBINS, SIR COLIN McVEAN UNITED KINGDOM
 GUICHARD, BARON OLIVIER FRANCE
 GUILLAUME, BARON JULES BELGIUM
 GUINDEY, GUILLAUME FRANCE
 HAFSTAD, LAWRENCE R. UNITED STATES
 HALL-PATCH, SIR EDMUND UNITED KINGDOM
 HALLSTEIN, WALTHER EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
 COMMUNITY
 HAMPDEN, THE VISCOUNT UNITED KINGDOM
 HARSCH, JOSEPH C. UNITED STATES
 HAUGE, GABRIEL UNITED STATES
 HAUGE, JENS CHRISTIAN NORWAY
 HAYS, BROOKS UNITED STATES
 HEALEY, DENIS UNITED KINGDOM
 HEENEY, ARNOLD D. P. CANADA
 HEILPERIN, MICHAEL A. UNITED STATES
 HEINZ II, HENRY J. UNITED STATES
 HERTER, CHRISTIAN A. UNITED STATES
 HEYN, ROLF † GERMANY
 HIRSCHFELD, H. M. † NETHERLANDS
 HOCHSCHILD, HAROLD K. UNITED STATES
 HOEGH, LEIF NORWAY
 HOFFMAN, PAUL G. UNITED STATES
 HOLMES, JOHN W. CANADA
 HOPE, THE LORD JOHN UNITED KINGDOM
 HYDE, H. MONTGOMERY UNITED KINGDOM

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ISMAY, THE LORD UNITED KINGDOM
 IVEROTH, AXEL SWEDEN
 JACKSON, C. D. UNITED STATES
 JACKSON, WILLIAM H. UNITED STATES
 JACOBSSON, PER I.M.F.
 JAY, DOUGLAS P. T. UNITED KINGDOM
 JAY, NELSON DEAN UNITED STATES
 JELlicoe, THE EARL UNITED KINGDOM
 KANELLOPOULOS, PANHYOTIS GREECE
 KAPTEYN, P. J. NETHERLANDS
 KENNAN, GEORGE F. UNITED STATES
 KESWICK, JOHN UNITED KINGDOM
 KIESINGER, KURT G. GERMANY
 KILMUIR, THE VISCOUNT UNITED KINGDOM
 KIPPING, SIR NORMAN V. UNITED KINGDOM
 KISSINGER, HENRY A. UNITED STATES
 KLEFFENS, EELCO N. VAN E.C.S.C.
 KNOLLYS, THE VISCOUNT UNITED KINGDOM
 KOHNSTAMM, MAX ACTION COMMITTEE FOR
 AN UNITED STATES OF
 EUROPE
 KONINGSBERGER, VICTOR J. NETHERLANDS
 KRAFT, OLE B. DENMARK
 KRAO, JENS O. DENMARK
 KRISTENSEN, THORKIL O.E.C.D.
 LAGARDE, COMTE JEAN DE FRANCE
 LESAGE, JEAN CANADA
 LETOURNEAU, JEAN FRANCE
 LEVERKUEHN, PAUL M. A. GERMANY
 LIEFTINCK, PIETER NETHERLANDS
 LINDEBRAEKE, SJUR NORWAY
 LITTLEJOHN, EDWARD UNITED STATES
 LONGO, IMBRIANI ITALY
 MAILLARD, WILLIAM S. UNITED STATES

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MALAGODI, GIOVANNI ITALY
 MARCHAND, JEAN CANADA
 MARJOLIN, ROBERT E. FRANCE
 MARTIN, EDWARD M. UNITED STATES
 MARTIN, PAUL CANADA
 MASON, EDWARD S. UNITED STATES
 MATHON, TH. E. E. H. NETHERLANDS
 MAUDLING, REGINALD UNITED KINGDOM
 MAUROIS, ANDRÉ FRANCE
 MCCLOY, JOHN J. UNITED STATES
 MCCORMACK, JAMES UNITED STATES
 McDONALD, DAVID J. UNITED STATES
 MCGHEE, GALE UNITED STATES
 MCGHEE, GEORGE C. UNITED STATES
 MCGILL, RALPH E. UNITED STATES
 MEHNERT, KLAUS GERMANY
 MELANDER, JOHAN NORWAY
 MENDERES, ADNAN † TURKEY
 MENNE, W. ALEXANDER GERMANY
 MESSERI, GIROLAMO ITALY
 MICHENER, ROLAND CANADA
 MOE, FINN NORWAY
 MOLDEN, FRITZ P. AUSTRIA
 MOLLET, GUY FRANCE
 MOLSON, HARTLAND DE M. CANADA
 MONRONEY, A. S. MIKE UNITED STATES
 MORISOT, GEORGES FRANCE
 MOSELEY, PHILIP E. UNITED STATES
 MOTZ, ROGER BELGIUM
 MUELLER, RUDOLF GERMANY
 MUELLER-ARMACK, ALFRED GERMANY
 MURPHY, ROBERT D. UNITED STATES
 NASH, FRANK C. † UNITED STATES
 NEAL, ALFRED C. UNITED STATES

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UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED STATES
CANADA
UNITED STATES
NETHERLANDS
CANADA
GERMANY
UNITED STATES
ITALY
SWITZERLAND
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY
GERMANY
UNITED STATES
BELGIUM
NETHERLANDS
SWEDEN
ITALY

PORTUGAL
TURKEY
ITALY
SWITZERLAND
GERMANY
GERMANY
UNITED STATES
S.H.A.P.E.
UNITED STATES
BELGIUM

GERMANY
NORWAY

RUGE, FRIEDRICH
RUSK, DEAN
RYCKMANS, PIERRE †
SAMKALDEN, IVO
SANDLER, RICKARD
SARACENO, PASQUALE
SARMENTO RODRIGUES,
MANUEL M.
SARPER, SELIM
SCARPA, GINO
SCHAFFNER, HANS
SCHMID, CARLO
SCHNEIDER, ERNST G.
SCHNITZLER, WILLIAM F.
SCHUYLEK, C. V. R.
SCOTT, HUGH
SEGBERS, PAUL W.
SENGER UND ETTERLIN,
FRIDO VON
SKAUG, ARNE

FRANCE
UNITED STATES
NETHERLANDS
SWEDEN
SWEDEN
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES
CANADA
SWITZERLAND
BELGIUM
UNITED KINGDOM
CANADA
UNITED STATES

GERMANY
UNITED KINGDOM
UNITED KINGDOM
FRANCE

PAKISTAN
BELGIUM
UNITED STATES
TURKEY

BILDERBERG ME

With the Compliments of

JOSEPH E. JOHNSON

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BILDERBERG MEETINGS

HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE UNITED STATES
BILDERBERG MEETINGS

20 October 1966

Confidential

Dear Sir,


I have pleasure in enclosing a copy of the summary of the Bilderberg Conference held at Wiesbaden, Germany, on 25, 26 and 27 March 1966, together with copies of the speeches of Sir Andrew Cohen, Prof. Mason, Mr. Woods and Mr. Bell, held during the Conference.

I may remind you of the personal and strictly confidential character of these summaries.

If you wish, for future correspondence, any changes in the way Bilderberg correspondence is sent to you (title, name, function, address) you are kindly requested to inform the Secretariat of the modifications you may desire, if possible in a short delay.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,



Arnold T. Lamping

Shown above is yet another "confidential" letter to a Bilderberg "friend" which accompanied a summary of the 1966 Bilderberg conference in Wiesbaden, Germany. Note that the author of the letter, Arnold Lamping, reminds the recipient of "the personal and strictly confidential character of these summaries." Attached to the letter was the calling card of Joseph E. Johnson, the Carnegie Endowment official who also served as "honorary secretary general for the United States" for the "Bilderberg Meetings"—quite an impressive title indeed for a functionary with an organization that proclaims its to be "unofficial."

On this and the following four pages is reproduced a summary (dated October 1982) of all of the preceding Bilderberg meetings. Note on the cover sheet that it was "RECEIVED FOR WINSTON LORD." Lord, another Bilderberger, has been a long-time top-level official of the Council on Foreign Relations and has served, in among other posts, as U.S. Ambassador to China. Note (below) that Bilderberg had two mailing addresses: one at its official headquarters in the Netherlands and one at an entity in New York known as "American Friends of Bilderberg, Inc." which is a public relations group that appears to have the Bilderberg Group as its sole client. Any time investigative reporters have contacted the "American Friends" for details on upcoming Bilderberg conferences, Charles W. Muller, the "friend" in charge, has little to say, thereby forcing investigative reporters such as Jim Tucker, correspondent for The SPOTLIGHT, to infiltrate Bilderberg meetings on his own and to rely on his own friendly sources who agree that the Bilderberg's secrecy is wrong.

Bilderberg Meetings

RECEIVED FOR

October 1982

NOV 8 1982

WINSTON LORD

BILDERBERG

1. Origin

The Bilderberg meetings are held annually to discuss important issues affecting Western Europe, the United States and Canada.

Bilderberg takes its name from the Bilderberg Hotel in Oosterbeek, Holland where the first meeting took place in May 1954.

That pioneering meeting grew out of the concern expressed by many leading citizens on both sides of the Atlantic that Western Europe and North America were not working together as closely as they should on matters of critical importance.

It was felt that regular, off-the-record discussions would help create a better understanding of the complex forces and major trends affecting Western nations in the difficult postwar period.

2. Character of meetings

What is unique about Bilderberg, as a forum, is (1) the broad cross-section of leading citizens, both in and out of government, it brings together for nearly three days of informal discussion about topics of current concern especially in the fields of foreign affairs and the international economy, (2) the strong feeling among the participants that in view of the differing attitudes and experiences of the Western nations, there is a clear need to develop a consensus in which these concerns can be accommodated and (3) the privacy of the meetings, which has no purpose other than to allow men and women of standing to speak their minds openly and freely.

In short, Bilderberg is a high-ranking, flexible and informal international forum in which different viewpoints can be expressed and mutual understanding enhanced.

Inquiries related to Bilderberg should be addressed to:

Mrs. Anne Hoogendoorn
Bilderberg Meetings
P.O. Box 30418
2500 GK The Hague
The Netherlands

Mr. Charles W. Muller
American Friends of Bilderberg, Inc.
39 East 51st Street
New York, N.Y. 10022
U.S.A.

3. Chairman

The first meeting was convened under the chairmanship of H.R.H. Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, who served as chairman for twenty-two years. He was succeeded by Lord Home of the Hirsel, former Prime-Minister of the United Kingdom, who chaired the meetings for four years. At the 1980 meeting in Aachen, Federal Republic of Germany, Lord Home turned over the chairmanship to Walter Scheel, former President of the German Federal Republic.

4. Participants

Each year, the members of the Steering Committee compile an invitation list for the following year's meeting.

To ensure full discussion, individuals representing a wide range of political and economic points of view are selected. The overall goal is to have approximately 75 participants from Western Europe and Canada and 25 from the United States.

Within this framework, an average about one-third are from the Government and political sector and the remaining two-thirds from a variety of fields including finance, industry, labor, education and communications. Participants are selected for their knowledge, experience and standing and with reference to the topics on the Agenda.

Participants attend Bilderberg in a private and not in an official capacity.

5. Conferences

Bilderberg's principal activity is its Conference program.

In the beginning, they were relatively frequent and restricted in attendance. Subsequently, it became the practice to hold no more than one major conference a year. Working papers, prepared by experts form the groundwork for Bilderberg discussions. At the meetings themselves, no resolutions are proposed, no votes taken, and no policy statements issued.

A report of the meeting, which includes working papers, is circulated to participants and former participants. Since 1954, 30 conferences have been held (see annex).

The names of the participants as well as the Agenda items are made available before the annual meeting and are listed in the report.

6. Funding

The expenses of maintaining the Bilderberg meetings are covered wholly by private subscription; these expenses consist of the cost of the small Secretariat, travel reimbursement of participants requesting it and the publication of the meeting's reports.

The hospitality costs of the annual meeting are the responsibility of the Steering Committee members of the host country.

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Members Steering Committee

Chairman:

Walter Scheel
Former President, Federal Republic of Germany

Hon. Secretary-General for Europe:

Victor Halberstadt
Professor of Public Finance, Leyden University

Hon. Secretary-General for U.S.A.:

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University

Hon. Treasurer:

Willem F. Duisenberg
President, De Nederlandsche Bank N.V.

Austria:

Hannes Androsch
Chairman of the Managing Board, Creditanstalt-Bankverein

Belgium:

Daniel E. Janssen
Chairman, Federation of Belgian Enterprises
Baron Léon Lambert
Chairman, Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA

Canada:

Donald S. Macdonald
Senior Partner, McCarthy & McCarthy

Denmark:

Niels Nørlund
Editor-in-Chief, Berlingske Tidende

Fed. Rep. of Germany:

Alfred Herrhausen
Managing Director, Deutsche Bank A.G.
Theo Sommer
Editor-in-Chief, "Die Zeit"

France:

Thierry de Montbrial
Director, French Institute of International Relations and
Professor of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique
Antoine Seillière
Dep. Director-General, Compagnie Générale d'Industrie
et de Participations

Greece:

Costa Carras
Member of the Board, Union of Greek Shipowners

Iceland:

Geir Hallgrímsson
Member of Parliament

Italy:

Romano Prodi
Professor of Industrial Economics, University of Bologna
Stefano Silvestri
Vice-Director, Institute International Affairs

Norway:

Niels Werring Jr.
Senior Partner, Wih. Wilhelmsen

Sweden:

Sten Gustafsson
Managing Director, SAAB-SCANIA AB

Switzerland:

Franz Lütolf
General Manager and member of the Executive Board,
Swiss Bank Corporation

Turkey:

Selahattin Beyazit
Director of Companies

United Kingdom:

Andrew Knight
Editor, "The Economist"

Sir John Sainsbury
Chairman, Sainsbury PLC

United States of America:

✓ Jack F. Bennett
Director and Senior Vice-President, EXXON Corporation

✓ Murray H. Finley
President, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union
AFL-CIO, CLC

— Paul B. Finney 212-722-3173 (r) *Steering Committee*
Editorial Director, Thomson Magazines *203-964-8700*
let the organization

Charles Getchell
Lawyer and private trustee;
Rapporteur, Bilderberg Meetings

Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.
Partner, Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld

✓ [Henry A. Kissinger
Former Secretary of State

Winston Lord
President, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

*William Bundy
Gen'l. Sec'y
At one time
Ted took over*

✓ Bruce K. MacLaury
President, The Brookings Institution
Arthur R. Taylor 212-469-7600
Managing Partner, Arthur Taylor & Company
Joseph H. Williams
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Williams Companies
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Members of the Advisory Group*

Canada:

Anthony G. S. Griffin
Company Director

Fed. Rep. of Germany:

Otto Wolff von Amerongen
Chairman of the Board of Management and Chief Executive
Officer, Otto Wolff A.G.

International:

Max Kohnstamm
Former President, European University in Florence

Italy:

Giovanni Agnelli
President Fiat S.p.A.

Netherlands:

Ernst H. van der Beugel
Professor International Relations, Leyden University;
Director of Companies

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Switzerland:

Victor Umbricht
Mediator East African Community;
Member of the Advisory Board, CIBA-GEIGY Limited

United Kingdom:

Lord Roll of Ipsden
Chairman, S.G. Warburg & Co., Ltd.

United States of America:

[George W. Ball
Former Undersecretary of State.

[William P. Bundy
Editor-in-Chief, "Foreign Affairs"

[Henry J. Heinz II
Chairman of the Board, H. J. Heinz Company and
President of American Friends of Bilderberg, Inc.

[David Rockefeller
Chairman, Chase International Advisory Committee

* All former members of the Steering Committee

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ANNEX II

Conferences

1954-1982

1. 29-31 May 1954
Oosterbeek, Netherlands

Subjects:

- A. The attitude towards communism and the Soviet Union;
- B. The attitude towards dependent areas and peoples overseas;
- C. The attitude towards economic policies and problems;
- D. The attitude towards European integration and the European Defence Community.

2. 18-20 March 1955
Barbizon, France

Subjects:

- A. Survey of Western European-USA relations since the first Bilderberg Conference;
- B. Communist infiltration in various Western countries;
- C. The uncommitted peoples:
 - 1. Political and ideological aspects;
 - 2. Economic aspects.

3. 23-25 September 1955
Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Fed. Rep. of Germany

Subjects:

- A. Review of events since the Barbizon Conference;
- B. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
- C. The political and strategic aspects of atomic energy;
- D. The reunification of Germany;
- E. European unity;
- F. The industrial aspects of atomic energy;
- G. Economic problems:
 - 1. East-West trade;
 - 2. The political aspects of convertibility;
 - 3. Expansion of international trade.

4. 11-13 May 1956
Fredensborg, Denmark

Subjects:

- A. Review of developments since the last Conference;
B. The causes of the growth of anti-Western blocs, in particular in the United Nations;
C. The role played by anti-colonialism in relations between Asians and the West;
D. A common approach by the Western world towards China and the emergent nations of South and East Asia;
E. The communist campaign for political subversion or control of the newly emancipated countries of Asia;
F. How the West can best meet Asian requirements in the technical and economic fields.

5. 15-17 February 1957
St. Simons Island, U.S.A.

Subjects:

- A. Review of events since the fourth Bilderberg meeting in May 1956;
B. Nationalism and neutralism as disruptive factors inside the Western Alliance;
C. The Middle East;
D. The European policy of the Alliance, with special reference to the problems of Eastern Europe, German reunification and military strategy.

6. 4-6 October 1957
Fiuggi, Italy

Subjects:

- A. Survey of developments since the last conference;
B. Modern weapons and disarmament in relation to Western security;
C. Are existing political and economic mechanisms within the Western community adequate?

11. 18-20 May 1962
Saltsjöbaden, Sweden

Subjects:

- A. The political implications for the Atlantic community of its members' policies in the United Nations;
B. Implications for the Atlantic community of prospective developments.

12. 29-31 May 1963
Cannes, France

Subjects:

- A. The balance of power in the light of recent international development;
B. Trade relations between the U.S.A. and Europe in the light of the negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market;
C. Trade relations between the Western world and the developing countries.

13. 20-22 March 1964
Williamsburg, U.S.A.

Subjects:

- A. The consequences for the Atlantic Alliance of:
Apparent changes in the communist world
a) Soviet internal development;
b) The Communist Bloc;
B. Possible changes in the attitude of the USSR to the West;
C. Recent developments within the Western world:
a) political;
b) military;
c) economic.

7. 13-15 September 1958
Buxton, United Kingdom

Subjects:

- A. Survey of events since the last conference;
B. The future of NATO defence;
C. Western economic cooperation;
D. The Western approach to Soviet Russia and communism.

8. 18-20 September 1959
Yesilkoy, Turkey

Subjects:

- A. Review of developments since the last conference;
B. Unity and division in Western policy.

9. 28-29 May 1960
Bürgenstock, Switzerland

Subjects:

- A. State of the world situation after the failure of the Summit Conference;
B. New political and economic developments in the Western world

10. 21-23 April 1961
St. Castin, Canada

Subjects:

- A. What initiatives are required to bring about a new sense of leadership and direction within the Western community?
B. The implications for Western unity of changes in the relative economic strength of the United States and Western Europe.

16

14. 2-4 April 1965
Villa d'Este, Italy

Subjects:

- A. Monetary cooperation in the Western world;
B. The State of the Atlantic Alliance.

15. 25-27 March 1966
Wiesbaden, Fed. Rep. of Germany

Subjects:

- A. Should NATO be reorganized and if so how?
B. The future of world economic relations especially between industrial and developing countries.

16. 31 March - 2 April 1967
Cambridge, United Kingdom

Subjects:

- A. 1) Do the basic concepts of Atlantic cooperation remain valid for the evolving world situation?
2) If not, what concepts could take their place?
B. The technological gap between America and Europe with special reference to American investments in Europe.

17. 26-28 April 1968
Mont Tremblant, Canada

Subjects:

- A. The relations between the West and the Communist countries;
B. Internationalization of business.

18. 9-11 May 1969
Marienlyst, Denmark

Subjects:

- A. Elements of instability in Western society;
- B. Conflicting attitudes within the Western world towards relations with the USSR and the other Communist states of Eastern Europe in the light of recent events.

19. 17-19 April 1970
Bad Ragaz, Switzerland

Subjects:

- A. Future function of the University in our society;
- B. Priorities in foreign policy.

20. 23-25 April 1971
Woodstock, U.S.A.

Subjects:

- A. The contribution of business in dealing with current problems of social instability;
- B. The possibility of a change of the American role in the world and its consequences.

21. 21-23 April 1972
Knokke, Belgium

Subject:

The state of the Western community in the light of changing relationships among the non-communist industrialized countries and the impact of changing power relationships in the Far East on Western security.

22. 11-13 May 1973
Saltsjöbaden, Sweden

Subjects:

- A. The possibilities of the development of a European energy policy and the consequences for European-North American relations;
- B. Conflicting expectations concerning the European Security Conference.

23. 19-21 April 1974
Megève, France

Subject:

Prospects for the Atlantic world.

24. 25-27 April 1975
Çeşme, Turkey

Subjects:

- A. Inflation: its economic, social and political implications;
- B. Recent international political developments:
 - 1. The present status and prospects to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and the effect on relations among NATO members;
 - 2. Other recent developments affecting the relations among NATO countries.

In 1976 no Conference was held.

20

25. 22-24 April 1977
Torquay, England

Subjects:

North American and Western European attitudes towards
a) the future of the mixed economies in the Western democracies;

b) the Third World's demand for restructuring the world order and the political implications of those attitudes.

26. 21-23 April 1978
Princeton, New Jersey, U.S.A.

Subjects:

- A. Western defense with its political implications;
- B. The changing structure of production and trade: consequences for the Western industrialized countries.

27. 27-29 April 1979
Baden, Austria

Subjects:

- A. The present international monetary situation and its consequences for World cooperation;
- B. The implications of instability in the Middle East and Africa for the Western World.

28. 18-20 April 1980
Aachen, Fed. Rep. of Germany

Subject:

America and Europe: Past, Present and Future.

29. 15-17 May 1981
Bürgenstock, Switzerland

Subjects:

- A. What should Western policy be toward the Soviet Union in the 1980's?
- B. Obstacles to effective coordination of Western policies;
- C. How can the Western economies put their house in order?

30. 14-16 May 1982
Sandefjord, Norway

Subjects:

- A. Divergent Policies and Attitudes in the North Atlantic Community
- B. What can Arms Control Achieve?
- C. Middle East: Issues at Stake
- D. Economic Issues: Dogmas and Realities
- E. Current Events

And just for the record . . .

Here's proof—from the Arkansas press, if you can believe them—that former Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton did indeed attend the 1991 Bilderberg conference in Baden-Baden, Germany—a year before he was nominated for president by the Democratic Party (and long before the average American voter had ever heard his name). But the Bilderbergers knew who Clinton was. That's why he was the lone American governor—from a small, poor, rural state, no less—to be invited to the high-level international conference that year. Was Bill Clinton “annointed” by the Bilderbergers to become U.S. president at the conference? Some people think so . . .

This obscure news item appeared buried in the business section of the Arkansas Democrat on June 6, 1991 . . .

Clinton to attend trade conference

Gov. Bill Clinton will attend the 1991 Bilderberg Meeting today through Sunday, a conference of North American and Western European leaders, in Baden-Baden, Germany, according to a statement from his office.

“Of particular interest to the governor are trade and economic development opportunities for Arkansas,” the statement said.

And this item appeared in the same newspaper on June 12, 1991 . . .

Governor's visits abroad paid with private money

BY RACHEL O'NEAL
AND LARRY RHODES
Democrat Staff Writers

Private sponsors picked up the tab for Gov. Bill Clinton's recent trips to Germany and the Soviet Union — a journey he made without staff aides, spokesmen said Tuesday.

Mike Gauldin, the governor's spokesman, said the Bilderberg Conference paid for Clinton's trip to Germany and a Washington, D.C. philanthropist paid for the Soviet Union visit.

Susie Whitacre, another Clinton spokesman, said Clinton usually travels with staff members, but he chose to go to Europe alone.

“The reason he didn't have staff with him was due to limited space and limited provisions,” Whitacre said. “The sponsors asked that they not bring staff members with them.”

Clinton left the United States June 5 to attend the Bilderberg Conference, a three-day meeting in Baden-Baden, Germany.

Clinton's trip to Germany was a result of an invitation for the governor to visit the Soviet Union.

Clinton was in Moscow on Monday where he met with John Matlock Jr., the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union.

The governor was invited to attend the meeting in the Soviet Union by Ester Coopersmith, a Washington philanthropist and former U.S. representative to the United Nations.

Coopersmith and other American philanthropists arranged the trip to Moscow to present antibiotics to the Soviet government for the children of Chernobyl, the site of a massive radioactive disaster in

1986.

“He had planned for the trip to Moscow, but it was not confirmed until after he had left,” Gauldin said.

Clinton returned to Little Rock on Tuesday night.

The June 6-9 conference focused on issues involving the Middle East, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.


Clinton's interests in the conference were trade and economic development for Arkansas which will be made possible by the unification of European economies under the European Economic Community in 1992, the emergence of Eastern European nations from communism and recent economic changes in the Soviet Union, a news release said.

“It was a natural extension of the trip to Baden-Baden,” Gauldin said.

Clinton attended the conference at the invitation of Vernon Jordan, the former president of the National Urban League.

No, the existence of the Bilderberg Group is NOT a “right-wing extremist militia-type conspiracy theory” . . .

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


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FOR FURTHER READING...

Over the years, LIBERTY LOBBY and The SPOTLIGHT have made available a number of valuable reports relating to the topic of the Bilderberg Group, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Trilateral Commission. Shown here are four of the most recent reports, all of which are available from The SPOTLIGHT at the address below. *SPOTLIGHT on the Bilderbergers* (a 63-page booklet) is available at \$7 per copy; *Who's Behind the New World Order?*, a report on the CFR, is available at 10 copies for \$3. *The Bilderberg Group and the World Shadow Government* is available at 8 copies for \$6; and *The Trilateral Commission* is available at 8 copies for \$5. (A free book list will be included with your order.)



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CITIZEN-TIMES

PUBLISHING COMPANY


July 10, 1992

Dear Mrs. 

Thank you for your letter. Apparently, the only publication that has access to information on the so-called "Bilderbergs" is The Spotlight.

To my knowledge, such an organization does not exist and a media conspiracy to keep its existence a secret would be ludicrous.

Sincerely,



Larry Pope
Executive Editor

Some supposedly "well-informed" newspaper editors don't even know what they're talking about . . .

The letter reproduced here is not an attempt at humor. This letter is real. Only the name of the recipient has been "blacked out" to protect her privacy. We have not made an effort, however, to protect the identity of the letter writer. The author of the letter, Larry Pope, then the executive editor of the Asheville Citizen-Times, was responding to the reader's inquiry as to why his newspaper never reported on the activities of the Bilderberg Group, a powerful organization of international bankers, industrialists and political figures who meet annually with little or no coverage by the major media. Note Pope's reference to the "so-called" Bilderberg organization (suggesting that it perhaps does not exist) and his snide—but still strikingly accurate—suggestion that The SPOTLIGHT is "apparently, the only publication that has access to information" on the Bilderberg Group. However, Pope says, "to my knowledge, such an organization does not exist and a media conspiracy to keep its existence a secret would be ludicrous." Now, in the pages of this volume, here's all the evidence Mr. Pope needs to see to be convinced that the Bilderberg Group does exist and that it does try to operate under a veil of secrecy.

See inside for a remarkable collection of actual documents taken from inside the Bilderberg Group itself—documents never before published anywhere . . .